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ABSTRACT 
The decision on how to redress the perceived vulnerability of U.S. inter- 
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) is the most controversial strategic 
nuclear weapon decision now facing the 97th Congress. A full-scale debate on 
this issue, especially as regards MX missile basing, seems certain. To assist 
Members of Congress in the debate, this paper discusses nine proposals for 
treating ICBM survivability: Recognize that ICBMs are invulnerable, rely only 
on bombers and submarines for deterrence, deploy a large or scaled-down shell- 
game multiple shelter system, defend MX with antiballistic missiles, launch 
ICBMs on warning of attack, deploy MX on aircraft or small submarines, and 
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INTRODUCTION 
The d e c i s i o n  on how t o  r e d r e s s  t h e  pe rce ived  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  of  U.S. i n t e r -  
c o n t i n e n t a l  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  (ICBMs) i s  t h e  most c o n t r o v e r s i a l  s t r a t e g i c  
n u c l e a r  weapon d e c i s i o n  f a c i n g  t h e  9 7 t h  Congress .  A t  i s s u e  a r e  U.S. p o l i c y  
on I C B M s ,  a n t i b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  (ABMs), and o t h e r  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s ;  t h e  f u t u r e  
of SALT; t h e  budget ;  impacts  on l a r g e  a r e a s  of  t h e  n a t i o n ;  and pe rhaps  U.S. 
a b i l i t y  t o  p re se rve  de t e r r ence .  
The Uni ted  S t a t e s  i s  deve lop ing  a  new I C B M ,  t h e  MX. I t  i s  t o  be cons ide r -  
a b l y  l a r g e r  and more a c c u r a t e  t han  Minuteman 111, t h e  on ly  c u r r e n t l y  deployed 
multiple-warhead U.S. ICBM. There  a r e ,  however, f e a r s  abou t  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  
U.S. I C B M s  t o  s u r v i v e  a  t h r e a t  by a c c u r a t e  S o v i e t  I C B M s .  The need t o  r e t a i n  
s u r v i v a b l e  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s  i s  undisputed .  S ince  1J.S. p o l i c y  i s  t o  s t r u c t u r e  
f o r c e s  t h a t  can absorb  an  a t t a c k  and s t i l l  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e t a l i a t e ,  I C B M s  must 
be s u r v i v a b l e  i f  t h e y  a r e  t o  be  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h i s  p o l i c y .  S i n c e  m i s s i l e s  
a r e  q u i t e  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  n u c l e a r  weapon e f f e c t s ,  t h e i r  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  depends 
on how t h e y  a r e  based ,  u sed ,  o r  defended.  
Members of  Congress have exp res sed  i n t e r e s t  i n  a  wide v a r i e t y  of  p r o p o s a l s  
t o  ensu re  ICBM s u r v i v a b i l i t y .  While announcement of an A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  d e c i s i o n  
on MX bas ing  d e c i s i o n  a p p e a r s  imminent,  Congress  i s  n o t  power less  i n  t h e  m a t t e r  
and many Members w i l l  con t inue  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  range  of a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
Accordingly,  t h i s  r e p o r t  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  more prominent ones  and t h e  major  argu- 
ments f o r  and a g a i n s t  each. 
ICBM v u l n e r a b i l i t y  depends c r i t i c a l l y  on t h e  accuracy  of t h e  a t t a c k i n g  
f o r c e .  The S o v i e t s  have been improving I C B M  accuracy  d r a m a t i c a l l y  i n  t h e  l as t  
few y e a r s  and deploying  many a c c u r a t e  ICBMs.  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  many i n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  b e l i e v e  t h e  S o v i e t s  can  now, o r  i n  a  few y e a r s ,  d e s t r o y  perhaps  90% 
of U.S. I C B M s  i n  a  preemptive o r  f i r s t  s t r i k e .  1_/ Another p o s i t i o n  d i s a g r e e s .  
I t  contends  t h a t  many f a c t o r s  degrade  accu racy  and o the rwi se  impede a  f i r s t  
s t r i k e ,  making I C B M  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  a  c r e a t u r e  of t heo ry  t h a t  f o r  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  
f u t u r e  can  be  i gno red  i n  t h e  r e a l  world.  
Few have f e l t ,  however, t h a t  we c o u l d  j u s t  d i s m i s s  t h e  problem. A f t e r  a l l ,  
d e t e r r e n c e  h inges  on whether S o v i e t  l e a d e r s  b e l i e v e  they  could d e s t r o y  our  
I C B M s ,  n o t  whether  t h e y  would i n  f a c t  succeed.  Moreover, few want t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s  t o  be perce ived  a s  having one of i t s  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s  vu lne rab l e .  These 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  weighed, Congress  s t a t e d  i n  1976 t h a t  MX must be  su rv ivab ly  
based on land.  2-1 
For t h e s e  r e a s o n s ,  and o t h e r s  d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r ,  P r e s i d e n t  C a r t e r  recommended 
bas ing  MX i n  t h e  shell-game m u l t i p l e  p r o t e c t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  (MPS) system. He f e l t  
i t  would keep  MX on l and  s u r v i v a b l y ,  v e r i f i a b l y ,  a f f o r d a b l y ,  compat ib ly  w i t h  
SALT, and wi th  minimal envi ronmenta l  impact.  
P r e s i d e n t  Reagan cha l l enged  MPS i n  h i s  campaign, a p p a r e n t l y  because of  i t s  
s o c i a l  and envi ronmenta l  consequences, c o s t ,  and complexity. S ince  t ak ing  
o f f i c e ,  h i s  Admin i s t r a t i on  has  been look ing  f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  A t  one p o i n t  o r  
o t h e r ,  t h e  p r e s s  has r epo r t ed  t h a t  i t  has cons idered  bas ing  MX on s u r f a c e  s h i p s  
11 See,  f o r  example, IT. S. Department of Defense. Annual Repor t ,  F i s c a l  
Year 1 9 8 2 .  (Harold Brown, S e c r e t a r y  of Defense)  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  
O f f ,  1981. p. 111. 
2 1  U.S. Congress. Committee o f  Conference. Au tho r i z ing  Appropr i a t i ons  
f o r  ~ i s c a l  Year 1977 f o r  M i l i t a r y  Procurement . . . and f o r  o t h e r  purposes.  
S. Rept.  94-1004. To accompany H.R.  12438. 94 th  Congress ,  2d Ses s ion .  
Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  1977. p. 40. 
and a i r c r a f t ,  i n  3000-ft deep s i l o s  and a scaled-down KPS, and defending  MX 
w i th  ABMs. 21 The problems a r e  s o  complex, w i t h  s o  many r equ i r emen t s  imposed 
s imu l t aneous ly ,  t h a t  t he  Admin i s t r a t i on  has delayed t h e  d e c i s i o n  s e v e r a l  t imes.  
A s  o f  e a r l y  September,  t h e  s t a t u s  of v a r i o u s  o p t i o n s  was a s  f o l l o w s .  The 
A i r  Force  and t h e  Armed S e r v i c e s  Committees s t r o n g l y  suppor t ed  MXIMPS; some 
o t h e r  Members of Congress opposed i t ;  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  appeared  u n w i l l i n g  t o  dep loy  
t h e  f u l l  200-MX/4600-shelter system C a r t e r  proposed. Basing 100 MX i n  1000 
s h e l t e r s  now seems t h e  l e a d i n g  con tende r ,  even though t h a t  sys tem by i t s e l f  h a s  
very poor s u r v i v a l  p rospec t s  i n  a  determined a t t a c k .  (See  p. 25.)  
Airmobile  MX (AMMX) was r e p o r t e d  t o  be  t h e  l e a d i n g  c h a l l e n g e r  t o  MPS. I n  
e a r l y  August, t he  p r e s s  r epo r t ed  t h a t  S e c r e t a r y  Weinberger wanted t o  base  MX 
on C-5 a i r c r a f t  i n  t h e  mid-1980s, t h e n  dep loy  i n  t h e  l a t e  1980s a  new a i r c r a f t ,  
"Big B i r d , "  designed t o  keep MX a l o f t  f o r  days. Senator  Tower, R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
P r i c e  and Dickinson ,  and some A i r  Fo rce  g e n e r a l s  r e p o r t e d l y  c r i t i c i z e d  AMMX 
sha rp ly .  - 4 /  A t  t h i s  w r i t i n g ,  AMMX no longe r  seems an o p t i o n  f o r  e a r l y  deploy- 
ment,  bu t  r e s e a r c h  on i t  may con t inue .  
Small submarine b a s i n g  h a s  r e c e i v e d  modest c o n g r e s s i o n a l  s u p p o r t ,  b u t  t h e  
A i r  Force  opposes it .  The Navy i s  u n i n t e r e s t e d  i n  i t  because,  some b e l i e v e ,  i t  
could  t h r e a t e n  t h e  T r i d e n t  program, o f f e r s  no advantages  c v e r  T r i d e n t ,  and c o u l d  
l e a d  t o  d i s p u t e s  between t h e  Navy and A i r  Force over  r o l e s  and miss ions .  
3 /  See: Wilson, George. Weinberger Sugges t s  U.S. More W i l l i n g  To 
s t a t i o n  G I s  i n  Trouble  Spots  Abroad. Washington P o s t ,  Feb. 4 ,  1981: A l ,  A4 
( s u r f a c e  s h i p s ) ;  Robinson, C l a r e n c e ,  J r .  Weinberger Pushes  S t r a t e g i c  Airmobi le  
MX Concept.  Av ia t ion  Week and Space Technology, Aug. 3 ,  1981: 16-19 ( a i r m o b i l e  
and deep underground b a s i n g ) ;  Admin i s t r a t i on  Weighing Op t ions  i n  MX Bas ing  P l an .  
A v i a t i o n  Week and Space Technology, Sept .  7 ,  1981: 22-25 ( s m a l l  MPS and ABM), 
41 Tower, John. P r e s s  Conference,  Aug. 1 ,  1981. 5 p.; Wi lson ,  George. 
~ o u s e - ~ e a d e r s  Try To Down Airborne  MX. Washington P o s t ,  Aug. 1 3 ,  1981 : A l ;  
Evans, Rowland, and Rober t  Novak. Weingerger 's  F l y i n g  Trap.  Washington P o s t ,  
Aug. 10 ,  1981: A17. 
The near- term f u t u r e  of ABM d e f e n s e  of MX w i l l  b e  c r i t i c a l l y  a f f e c t e d  by 
t h e  MX ba s ing  d e c i s i o n .  S i l o  ba s ing  would need an  ABM de fense  t o  s u r v i v e  
u n l e s s  MX were launched  under  a t t a c k .  The 200-MX/4600-IQS sys t em cou ld  r e q u i r e  
a  Low A l t i t u d e  Defense ABM i f  t h e  S o v i e t s  were adding  R V s .  The 1 0 0 - ~ ~ / 1 0 0 0 - ~ ~ ~ ~  
would o f f e r  n e g l i g i b l e  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  w i t h o u t  a  much more e l a b o r a t e  ABM de fense .  
Small  submarines o r  AMMX would n o t  depend on ABMs f o r  s u r v i v a l .  Simple ABM 
sys tems  have r e c e i v e d  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  i n  Congress .  
Launching ICBYs on warning of a t t a c k  has  r ece ived  some c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
suppor t .  Some S e n a t o r s  have urged  t h a t  t h i s  approach  be r e a s s e s s e d .  51 The 
House Committee on I n t e r i o r  and I n s u l a r  A f f a i r s  recommended improving command 
and i n t e l l i g e n c e  sys tems  t h a t  would enhance U.S. a b i l i t y  t o  do s o .  5/ The 
S e n a t e  passed  an  amendment on May 1 4 ,  1981, adding $31.2 m i l l i o n  f o r  a  Surviv-  
a b l e  O p t i c a l  Forward A c q u i s i t i o n  System which,  i t s  advoca t e s  c l a imed ,  would 
enhance U.S. a b i l i t y  t o  launch  on warning. T h i s  o p t i o n  and "dus t  defense"  
( s e e  page 33)  a r e  t h e  on ly  t e c h n i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e  ways t o  keep  I C B M s  s u r v i v a b l e  
i n  t he  n e a r  term. 
The c a s e  t h a t  s i l o -based  I C B M s  a r e  i n v u l n e r a b l e  h a s  n o t  s t u c k .  A i r  Fo rce  
spokesmen have r e c e n t l y  cha l l enged  some of t h e s e  arguments.  Yet t h e r e  i s  
l i t t l e  s u p p o r t  i n  Congress  f o r  abandoning I C B M s .  
Some a r e  a rgu ing  t h a t  MX ba s ing  must be dec ided  no t  a s  a  s e p a r a t e  e n t i t y  
but  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of a  b roade r  v iew of 1J.S. s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s .  S e v e r a l  
S e n a t o r s  and t h e  TJouse Committee on I n t e r i o r  and I n s u l a r  A f f a i r s  t a k e  t h i s  
5 /  Garn, J a k e ,  and Pau l  L a x a l t .  MX Basing and a  N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  P o s t u r e  
f o r  t x e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  Repor t  accompanying p r e s s  r e l e a s e  by S e n a t o r  Garn of 
June  2 5 ,  1981. 14  p .  
6 /  U.S. Congress .  House. Committee on I n t e r i o r  and I n s u l a r  A f f a i r s .  
Bas ing  t h e  MX M i s s i l e .  97 th  Congress ,  1st Ses s ion .  Committee P r i n t  No. 2 .  
Washington, U.S. Govt.  P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1981. 2 8  p. 
p o s i t i o n ;  S e c r e t a r y  Weinberger has  r e p o r t e d l y  p re sen ted  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  
a  comprehensive p l a n  t o  upgrade s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s .  T h i s  p o s i t i o n  f u r t h e r  
recommends developing  v a r i o u s  weapons a s  hedges a g a i n s t  S o v i e t  weapons 
advances.  
ARE I C B M s  VULNERABLE? 
The bas ing  mode d e b a t e  assumes t h a t  U.S. I C B M s  a r e  becoming v u l n e r a b l e .  
Some d i s p u t e  t h i s ,  a rgu ing  t h a t  t h e  ICBM v u l n e r a b i l i t y  problem i s  a  c r e a t u r e  
of t h e o r e t i c a l  c a l c u l a t i o n s  and can  be i gno red  i n  t h e  r e a l  wor ld .  7 /  - 
Many u n c e r t a i n t i e s  reduce  an  a t t a c k e r ' s  con f idence  t h a t  i t  can success-  
f u l l y  s t r i k e  f i r s t .  The a b i l i t y  of  a n  I C B M  f o r c e  t o  d e s t r o y  an  oppos ing  ICBM 
f o r c e  depends on accuracy ,  e x p l o s i v e  y i e l d ,  numbers, and r e l i a b i l i t y  of r e e n t r y  
v e h i c l e s  (RVS), and r e l i a b i l i t y  of  I C B M s .  Accuracy i s  of  p a r t i c u l a r  importance.  
A s  f i g u r e  1 shows, deg rada t ions  of accuracy  beyond a  c e r t a i n  p o i n t  (depending 
on RV y i e l d  and s i l o  ha rdnes s )  d r a s t i c a l l y  reduce  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  a n  RV 
can d e s t r o y  an ICBM s i l o .  P e t  eve ry  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  t r a j e c t o r y  i s  a f f e c t e d  
by anomal ies  i n  t h e  e a r t h ' s  g r a v i t a t i o n a l  and magnet ic  f i e l d s .  While a n  I C B M ' s  
t r a j e c t o r y  can be a d j u s t e d  f o r  known anomal ies ,  n e i t h e r  s i d e  has  f lown ICBMs 
over  t h e  n o r t h  p o l e  f o r  obvious  r ea sons .  I t  i s  argued  t h a t  t h e  anomal ies  of  
t h i s  t r a j e c t o r y ,  being unknown, would degrade  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  accu racy  by 
some unknown amount. Weather c o n d i t i o n s  o v e r  t h e  t a r g e t  would a l s o  a f f e c t  
accuracy .  
7 1  See,  f o r  example, Anderson, J .  Edward. Are We Vu lne rab l e  t o  a  F i r s t  
s t r i k e ?  P r e p u b l i c a t i o n  d r a f t .  Minneapol i s ,  Dept. of Mechanical Eng inee r ing ,  
U n i v e r s i t y  of  Minnesota,  May 1981. 3 4  p. 
FIGURE 1. Single-Shot  K i l l  P r o b a b i l i t y  (SSKP) 
vs .  C i r c u l a r  E r r o r  P robab l e  (CEP) 
ns: T h i s  graph p r e s e n t s  d a t a  f o r  a  L- 
500-kiloton weapon used a g a i n s t  a  s i l o  5 
hardened t o  wi ths tand  o v e r p r e s s u r e s  of -- 
2000 pounds p e r  square  inch .  - - 
, t h e  r a d i u s  of 
- 
a  c i r c l e  w i t h i n  which h a l f  of  t h e  R V s  of 
a type  of ICBM can be expected t o  f a l l .  
T h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  a n  SSKP of 1.00 i s  n e v e r  
ach ievable .  However, f o r  CEPs approach- 
i n g  z e r o ,  SSKP approaches 1.00 
Data  c a l c u l a t e d  us ing  Genera l  E l e c t r i c  CEP 
C a l c u l a t o r ,  c o p y r i g h t  1978 by P e r r y g r a f  
D i v i s i o n  of Nashua Gorp. 
Circular Error Probable ( n a u t i c a l  miles) 
The b l a s t ,  d u s t ,  h e a t ,  wind c u r r e n t s ,  e t c . ,  o f  a  n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i o n  would 
d i s a b l e  o r  knock o f f  cou r se  any R V s  f l y i n g  nea r  i t  f o r  some minu te s ,  an e f f e c t  
known a s  f r a t r i c i d e .  To avo id  f r a t r i c i d e ,  R V s  must a t t a c k  one  s i d e  o f  a  m i s s i l e  
f i e l d ,  t hen  sweep toward t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  on a  p r e c i s e  schedule .  A more d i f f i c u l t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  t o  have a l l  R V s  i n  e a c h  m i s s i l e  f i e l d  exp lode  a t  abou t  t h e  same 
i n s t a n t .  Each method r e q u i r e s  g r e a t  coo rd ina t ion .  
While each  RV t h a t  r e a c h e s  i t s  t a r g e t  h a s  a  v e r y  good chance  o f  d e s t r o y i n g  
t h e  t a r g e t ,  ICBM r e l i a b i l i t y  i s  not  n e a r l y  s o  good. An a t t a c k e r  would t h e r e f o r e  
p r e f e r  t o  u s e  two R V s  p e r  t a r g e t ,  doub l ing  t h e  number of  R V s  needed. These R V s  
should come from d i f f e r e n t  m i s s i l e s  s o  t h a t  one m i s s i l e ' s  f a i l u r e  would not  
l e a v e  one o r  more s i l o s  u n t a r g e t e d .  Th i s  " c r o s s - t a r g e t i n g "  adds  t o  t h e  com- 
p l e x i t y  of c o o r d i n a t i n g  an  a t t a c k .  
The r e l i a b i l i t y  of equipment and pe r sonne l  i n  l aunch ing  a  p r e c i s e l y  coo rd i -  
na ted  a t t a c k  wi th  thousands of R V s  i s  u n c e r t a i n .  A f t e r  a l l ,  s u p p o r t e r s  of t h i s  
p o s i t i o n  n o t e ,  t h e  e n t i r e  sys tem cannot  be  t e s t e d ,  b u t  must work n e a r l y  p e r f e c t l y  
t h e  f i r s t  t i m e .  F i n a l l y ,  an a t t a c k e r  would f e a r  t h a t  t h e  opposing s i d e  would 
launch  i t s  I C B M s  on warning of a t t a c k .  Indeed ,  on viewing p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  an  
a t t a c k ,  such a s  moving many b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  submarines o u t  t o  s e a ,  t h e  o t h e r  
s i d e  might p repa re  t o  l aunch  on warning. 
D e t a i l e d  and s p e c i f i c  r e sponse  t o  t h e s e  p o i n t s  would be h i g h l y  c l a s s i f i e d .  
I n  g e n e r a l ,  responses  a r e  of two types .  F i r s t ,  t h e  impact  of t h e  e r r o r  f a c t o r s  
have been determined v e r y  w e l l  by i n t e g r a t i n g  measurements o b t a i n e d  o v e r  t h e  
l a s t  20 y e a r s ,  u s ing  s a t e l l i t e s  and on - s i t e  survey  d a t a  t o  measure g r a v i t a -  
t i o n a l  anomal ies  a l o n g  f l i g h t  p a t h s ,  examining changes i n  t h e  e a r t h ' s  magnet ic  
f i e l d  under d i f f e r e n t  c i rcumstances ,  conduct ing  m i s s i l e  f l i g h t  t e s t s  a long  many 
different trajectories, and so on. 81 Atmospheric conditions have minor effects 
on accuracy, it is argued, and a missile's trajectory can be adjusted for weather 
at the target prior to launch. For these and other reasons, the U.S. intelli- 
gence community believes that uncertainties would not degrade projected ICBM 
accuracies beyond the point where they have a high probability of destroying 
ICBM silos. - 91 
The rebuttal to arguments based on difficulties of coordinating an attack 
is that the United States should not rest the survivability of its ICBMs on 
problems that Soviet planners may encounter in calculating the times for 
launching ICBMs and the trajectories their RVs are to follow. So doing, it 
is argued, would undermine for friends and foes alike the perception that the 
United States is committed to preserving the value of its strategic forces, 
especially ICBMs, which comprise a substantial part of our deterrent capability 
and almost all of our existing prompt counterforce capability. It is Soviet 
perceptions of the vulnerability of our ICBMs, not our calculations of their 
vulnerability, that affect Soviet war plans. 
81 Mann, Paul. Panel Examines ICBM Vulnerability. Aviation Week and 
~ ~ a c e - ~ e c h n o l o ~ ~ ,  July 13, 1981: 141+; Administration Weighing Options in MX 
Basing Plan. Aviation Week and Space Technology, Sept. 7, 1981: 22-25. 
91 U.S. Air Force. Office of the Special Assistant for MX Matters. 
~ele~hone conversation, Sept. 16, 1981. 
CAN WE ABANDON LAND-BASED ICBMs? 
One group o f  t h o s e  who assume t h a t  I C B M s  a r e  v u l n e r a b l e ,  o r  t h a t  we cannot  
r e l y  f o r  d e t e r r e n c e  on I C B M s  t h a t  appear  v u l n e r a b l e ,  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  should  move t o  a  dyad of submarines and bombers, s u i t a b l y  upgraded. T h i s  
p o s i t i o n  opposes deploying  new I C B M s  f o r  t h e  fo l lowing  r ea sons :  
-- Dete r r ence  d o e s n ' t  r e q u i r e  much i n  t h e  way of  s u r v i v i n g  f o r c e s .  
A few hundred R V s  t h a t  can s u r v i v e  a t t a c k  and p e n e t r a t e  t o  t h e i r  
t a r g e t s  cou ld  d e v a s t a t e  t h e  S o v i e t  Union and d e t e r  any  r a t i o n a l  
S o v i e t  l e a d e r ;  no amount of f o r c e  could  d e t e r  a n  i r r a t i o n a l  l e a d e r .  
-- There i s  no p o l i t i c a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e  way of bas ing  I C B M s  s u r v i v a b l y  
on land .  MPS- o r  s i lo -based  ICBMs can  be t a r g e t e d  and des t royed .  
Land-mobile I C B M s  can  be bar raged .  A t t acks  on e i t h e r  would 
g e n e r a t e  huge amounts of f a l l o u t .  Launching I C B M s  on warning of 
a t t a c k  e n t a i l s  huge r i s k s .  ABM de fense  would be  c o s t l y ,  would 
r e q u i r e  r e n e g o t i a t i n g  o r  withdrawing from t h e  .ABM T r e a t y ,  and 
may be i n e f f e c t i v e .  I t  i s  p o i n t l e s s  t o  pour money i n t o  r e t a i n i n g  
a n  i r r emed iab ly  v u l n e r a b l e  system. 
-- Deploying new I C B M s  p l a y s  t o  S o v i e t  s t r e n g t h  by p r o v i d i n g  t a r g e t s  
f o r  t h e  many a c c u r a t e  S o v i e t  ICBM R V s .  I n s t e a d ,  by enhancing 
our  bomber and submarine f o r c e s  and fo rego ing  new I C B M s ,  we c o u l d  
d e f e a t  t h e  massive S o v i e t  inves tment  i n  c o u n t e r f o r c e  I C B M s  and 
t h e  s t r a t e g y  on which i t  i s  based.  
-- The T r i d e n t  I1 (D-5) m i s s i l e  could  become o p e r a t i o n a l  i n  1989, 
and cou ld  improve t h e  T r i d e n t  I m i s s i l e ' s  r ange ,  a c c u r a c y ,  and 
payload.  - 101 The United S t a t e s  could  des ign  a  T r i d e n t  
submar ine1Tr ident  I1 sys tem t o  e x e c u t e  prompt c o u n t e r f o r c e  
a t t a c k s .  111 It would be h i g h l y  s u r v i v a b l e ,  and could  endure 
( i . e . ,  o p e r a t e  i f  i t  s u r v i v e s  t h e  i n i t i a l  a t t a c k )  f o r  months. 
S i n c e  t h e  f l e e t  would o p e r a t e  over  v a s t  ocean a r e a s ,  i t  would be 
i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  numbers of S o v i e t  R V s .  I t  would a t t r a c t  few 
S o v i e t  RVs t o  land .  Very few submarines would be needed t o  
p r o v i d e  t h e  1000 o r  s o  R V s  t h a t  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  hopes  would 
s u r v i v e  from an  MX system. T r i d e n t  I1 would presumably c a r r y  
between 8  R V s  (which T r i d e n t  I c a r r i e s )  and 14 R V s  ( t h e  maximum 
pe rmi t t ed  by SALT 1 1 ) .  F i v e  submarines armed wi th  8-RV T r i d e n t  
11s would c a r r y  960 R V s ;  3 armed w i t h  14-RV T r i d e n t  11s would 
c a r r y  1008 RVs.  I f  t h e  T r i d e n t  submarine has a  66% a t -sea  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  ove r  i t s  l i f e t i m e ,  a s  p lanned ,  121 5 t o  8  submarines 
would permit  3 t o  5 t o  be on s t a t i o n  a t  a l l  t imes .  We could  guard 
a g a i n s t  S o v i e t  advances i n  an t i submar ine  w a r f a r e  (ASW) by pursu ing  
101  Zeiberg ,  Seymour (Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense f o r  Research and 
~ n ~ i n z r i n ~  ( S t r a t e g i c  and Space Systems)) .  Testimony f o r  t h e  Sea Based 
Nuclear  D e t e r r e n t  Force  Hear ing  of  t h e  S t r a t e g i c  Programs Subcommittee, Sena t e  
Armed S e r v i c e s  Committee. Feb. 27, 1981. p. 1-3. 
11/ Regarding t h e  D-5's c o u n t e r f o r c e  c a p a b i l i t y ,  s e e  C a r t e r ,  Powel l ,  J r .  
( ~ e a r A d m i r a 1 ,  USN, D i r e c t o r ,  S t r a t e g i c  and Thea t e r  Nuclear  Warfare D iv i s ion ,  
O f f i c e  o f  t h e  Chief  of  Naval Ope ra t ions ) .  S ta tement  b e f o r e  t h e  Subcommittee 
on S t r a t e g i c  and Thea t e r  Nuclear  f o r c e s  of t h e  Sena t e  Armed S e r v i c e s  Committee 
on Sea Based D e t e r r e n t ,  Feb. 27 ,  1981. p. 4-6. The r e q u i r e d  r e spons ivenes s  
would need c e r t a i n  procedures and technology,  bu t  they could  be ob ta ined  i f  a  
d e c i s i o n  were made t o  do so .  Based on d i s c u s s i o n s  w i t h  D O D ,  Navy, and Congres- 
s i o n a l  pe r sonne l ,  Sept .  1981. 
121  Wil l iams,  John ,  J r .  (Vice  Admiral ,  USN, Deputy Chief  o f  Naval Opera- 
tions?or Submarine Warfare).  S taternent be fo re  t h e  Subcommit t e e  on Seapower 
of t h e  House Armed S e r v i c e s  Committee on t h e  FY82 Budget Request  f o r  S t r a t e g i c  
and T a c t i c a l  Submarine Forces .  [No d a t e ;  c.  Feb. 19811. p. 7 (VG-9). 
counter-ASW techniques  and by conduct ing  r e s e a r c h  and develop- 
ment (R&D) on s e v e r a l  hedge programs, such  a s  ABM, s m a l l  I C B M s ,  
a i r m o b i l e  I C B M s ,  and s n a l l  submarines,  any of which we could  
deploy  i n  response  t o  a  s p e c i f i c  f u t u r e  S o v i e t  t h r e a t .  A s  t h e  
U.S. ABM program i n  t h e  l a s t  decade shows, R&D-only programs 
can advance technology d r a m a t i c a l l y  a t  modest c o s t  even  wi thou t  
deploying  o p e r a t i o n a l  systems.  
-- The Uni ted  S t a t e s  cou ld  a l s o  a c c e l e r a t e  t h e  a i r - l aunched  
c r u i s e  m i s s i l e  program and proceed wi th  a  B-1,  an  advanced 
technology ( " s t e a l t h " )  bomber, o r  bo th .  
Advocates of r e t a i n i n g  a  t r i a d  composed of  land-based I C B M s ,  bombers, and 
submarines respond a s  fo l l ows :  
-- I t  i s  h a r d e r  t o  a t t a c k  s e v e r a l  independent  f o r c e s  s imu l t aneous ly .  
For  example, i f  ICBMs a r e  launched a g a i n s t  bombers and I C B M s ,  
bombers can  be launched on warning o f  a t t a c k .  But i f  submarine- 
launched b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  (SLBMs) a r e  launched a g a i n s t  bombers, 
and I C B M s  a r e  launched  a g a i n s t  I C B M s ,  t h e  bombers would be 
des t royed  be fo re  t h e  I C B M s  a r r i v e ,  conf i rming  warning of a t t a c k  
s o  t h a t  I C B M s  could  be launched .  
-- I t  i s  ha rde r  t o  defend a g a i n s t  s e v e r a l  independent  s t r a t e g i c  
f o r c e s ;  f o r  example, I C B M s  would a t t a c k  t h e  U.S.S.R. from t h e  
n o r t h ,  and SLBMs could  approach from v a r i o u s  d i r e c t i o n s .  Unl ike  
m i s s i l e s ,  bombers can  f l y  low and u s e  e v a s i v e  o r  s e l f - d e f e n s e  
t a c t i c s .  
-- D i f f e r e n t  f o r c e s  a r e  s u i t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  m i s s ions .  SLBMs, f o r  
example, a r e  a n  i d e a l  r e s e r v e  f o r c e  because  of t h e i r  n e a r  
i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y .  
-- Even i f  t h e  S o v i e t s  b e l i e v e  one of o u r  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s  i s  
v u l n e r a b l e  and t h u s  i n e f f e c t i v e  a s  a  d e t e r r e n t ,  t h e  o t h e r s  
could  s t i l l  d e t e r .  
-- Bombers a r e  of  q u e s t i o n a b l e  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  g i v e n  t h e  p r o s p e c t  
t h a t  an  a t t a c k  cou ld  d e s t r o y  many bombers a t  t h e i r  ba se s  and 
S o v i e t  a i r  d e f e n s e s  cou ld  d e s t r o y  bombers n e a r  t h e i r  t a r g e t s .  
A dyad would t h u s  i n  e f f e c t  r e s t  s o l e l y  on submar ines ,  making 
our  d e t e r r e n t  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  a  S o v i e t  ASW breakthrough.  
Some oppose a  bomber-submarine dyad on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  need f o r  land-based 
I C B M s .  They n o t e :  
-- I C B M s  have  a  unique combina t ion  of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  i n c l u d i n g :  
Rapid r e sponse  t ime ,  s h o r t  t ime  t o  t a r g e t ,  a b i l i t y  t o  d e s t r o y  
hard  t a r g e t s ,  h i g h  a l e r t  r a t e ,  a b i l i t y  t o  be r e t a r g e t e d  
r a p i d l y ,  and ve ry  good command and c o n t r o l .  g! I n  some bas ing  
modes, I C B M s  can  have  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  v e r i f i c a t i o n  f o r  SALT. 
131  A l l e n ,  Lew, J r .  (Gene ra l ,  Chief  o f  S t a f f ,  USAF). L e t t e r  t o  Repre- 
s e n t a z v e  Melvin P r i c e ,  Chairman, House Armed S e r v i c e s  Committee, Dec. 29,  1978. 
I n  U.S. Congress .  Sena t e .  Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s .  F i s c a l  Year  1979 
Supplemental  M i l i t a r y  Au tho r i za t i on .  Hear ings  on S. 429, a  B i l l  t o  Author ize  
A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  f o r  F i s c a l  Year 1979, i n  Add i t i on  t o  Amounts P r e v i o u s l y  Author- 
i z e d  f o r  Procurement of A i r c r a f t ,  M i s s i l e s ,  Naval V e s s e l s ,  . . . and f o r  Other  
Purposes .  96 th  Congress ,  1st S e s s i o n .  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  
1979. p. 166-167. 
-- 2 liminating ICBMs would free resources that the Soviets 
could devote to making our bombers and submarines vulnerable. 
-- Just as our bomber and submarine forces give us time to 
remedy ICBM vulnerability, so maintaining a survivable ICBM 
force would provide time in which to remedy a future weakness 
in the bomber or submarine force. 
-- The U.S. would convey an image of weakness by letting the 
Soviets drive U.S. ICBMs from land. 
MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES: THE BASELINE SYSTEM FOR BASING MX ON LAND 
A major  group  of  t h o s e  who b e l i e v e  ICBMs  a r e  v u l n e r a b l e  i n s i s t  t h a t  we 
r e t a i n  s u r v i v a b l e  land-based I C B M s .  Many of , t h i s  group want t o  deploy  MX; some 
want t o  deploy  i t  i n  a  m u l t i p l e  p r o t e c t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  (MPS) system. S i n c e  MPS 
i s  t h e  A i r  F o r c e ' s  p r e f e r r e d  s o l u t i o n ,  t h e  one p r e f e r r e d  by t h e  Ford admini- 
s t r a t i o n  - 141 and t h e  one s e l e c t e d  by P r e s i d e n t  C a r t e r  i n  September 1979, i t  i s  
t h e  b a s e l i n e  system and t h e  one t h a t  has  r ece ived  t h e  most a t t e n t i o n .  
G e n e r i c a l l y ,  a n  MPS i s  a  g i a n t  s h e l l  game, i n  which few m i s s i l e s  a r e  moved 
among many s h e l t e r s .  The s h e l t e r s  may be h o r i z o n t a l  o r  v e r t i c a l  and may be 
connec ted  by r o a d s ,  r a i l r o a d s ,  t u n n e l s ,  e t c .  The t h e o r y  u n d e r l y i n g  MPS i s  t h a t  
t he  S o v i e t s  would no t  know which s h e l t e r s  c o n t a i n  m i s s i l e s ,  s o  t h e y  would have 
t o  a t t a c k  a l l  t h e  s h e l t e r s  i n  a  f i r s t  s t r i k e .  Yet t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  would b u i l d  
s o  many s h e l t e r s  t h a t  t hey  c o u l d n ' t  a t t a c k  them a l l .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  some s h e l t e r s  
and m i s s i l e s  would s u r v i v e .  The S o v i e t s ,  knowing t h i s ,  would be  d e t e r r e d .  
MPS e n t a i l s  two key c o n d i t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  must p r even t  t h e  
S o v i e t s  from knowing which s h e l t e r s  c o n t a i n  m i s s i l e s .  T h i s  t a s k ,  known a s  
p r e s e r v a t i o n  of l o c a t i o n  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  o r  PLU, i s  d i f f i c u l t ;  t h e  O f f i c e  of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) s e e s  i t  a s  " t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  a  new technology ."  151 
A m i s s i l e ,  even i n  a  s h e l t e r ,  g i v e s  o f f  many s i g n a l s  t h a t  c a n  be used t o  d e t e c t  
i t ,  i n c l u d i n g  a c o u s t i c ,  communications, chemica l ,  magnet ic ,  n u c l e a r ,  s e i s m i c ,  
and thermal .  Loca t i on  u n c e r t a i n t y  must be preserved  a g a i n s t  ground s e n s o r s ,  
141  U.S. Department of Defense.  Annual Defense Department Repor t ,  
FY 19%. ( S e c r e t a r y  of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) Washington, 1J.S. Govt. P r i n t .  
O f f . ,  1977. p. 130 .  
15/  V.S. Congress.  O f f i c e  of Technology Assessment.  MX M i s s i l e  Basing:  -
Summary. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  June  1981. ( H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  a s  
"OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Basing:  Summary.") p. 1 6 .  
s a t e l l i t e s ,  and s e c u r i t y  b r eaches  wh i l e  t h e  m i s s i l e s  a r e  i n  s h e l t e r s  and be ing  
t r a n s p o r t e d .  I f  t h e  S o v i e t s  c o u l d  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  on even  one  o b s e r v a b l e ,  t h e  
l e v e r a g e  sought  by p r o l i f e r a t i n g  s h e l t e r s  would d i s a p p e a r  because  t h e y  could  
a t t a c k  200 s h e l t e r s  i n s t e a d  o f  4600 and overwhelm t h e  system. 
Second, MPS must respond t o  t h e  t h r e a t .  MPS s u r v i v a b i l i t y  does  no t  r i s e  i n  
d i r e c t  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  number of s h e l t e r s  dep loyed ,  b u t  r i s e s  v e r y  s l o w l y  
u n t i l  s h e l t e r s  outnumber a t t a c k i n g  R V s ,  t hen  r i s e s  r a p i d l y .  CBO n o t e s ,  "Thus, 
a n  MPS bas ing  sys tem i s  ' i n d i v i s i b l e '  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  Congress  cou ld  n o t  
reduce  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  proposed s h e l t e r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  program wi thou t  j eopard iz -  
i n g  t h e  pr imary  purpose of  t h e  system." E/ F i g u r e  2 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e s e  p o i n t s .  
FIGURE 2 .  MX M i s s i l e s  Su rv iv ing  vs.  MPS S h e l t e r s  Deployed 
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1 6 /  U.S. Congress.  Congre s s iona l  Budget O f f i c e .  The MX M i s s i l e  and 
~ u l t i z e  P r o t e c t i v e  S t r u c t u r e  Bas ing:  Long-Term Budgetary I m p l i c a t i o n s .  
Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  O f f . ,  1979. p. 30.  
ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Soviets have 2700 warheads to attack MPS. 
2. Soviets use 2 warheadslshelter when they can. 
3 .  Reliability of Soviet warheads - 0.85. 
4. Kill probability/reliable warhead 1.0. 
5. One MX deployed per 23 shelters. 
-- 
I f  t h e  S o v i e t s  add ICBM warheads,  and t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  chooses  t o  r e t a i n  
s u r v i v a b l e  land-based I C B M s ,  i t  must add s h e l t e r s ,  m i s s i l e s ,  o r  warheads p e r  
m i s s i l e ;  defend MPS w i t h  ABMs; o r  some combinat ion of t h e s e  approaches.  
C a r t e r  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  t h e  sys tem met t h e  fo l l owing  f i v e  c r i t e r i a .  171 I t  
promotes ICBM s u r v i v a b i l i t y .  I t  i s  adequa t e ly  v e r i f i a b l e .  I t  "minimizes t h e  
impact on  t h e  envi ronment , "  s i n c e  i t  r e q u i r e s  c l o s i n g  o f f  o n l y  3 3  s q u a r e  s t a t u t e  
m i l e s  from p u b l i c  use. I t  i s  a f f o r d a b l e ,  c o s t i n g  no more i n  c o n s t a n t  d o l l a r s  
t h a n  t h e  Minuteman, P o l a r i s ,  o r  B-52 programs. I t  i s  "compat ib le  w i t h  e x i s t i n g  
SALT agreements  and w i th  our  o b j e c t i v e s  f o r  SALT 111." MPS k e p t  I C B M s  on l a n d ,  
a  s i x t h  c r i t e r i o n  t h a t  C a r t e r  d i d  n o t  s t a t e .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  was de s igned  around 
t h e  MX r a t h e r  t han  ano the r  m i s s i l e .  
C a r t e r ' s  p l a n  c a l l e d  f o r  e a c h  of  200 MX m i s s i l e s  t o  be based  i n  i t s  own 
c l u s t e r  of 23 h o r i z o n t a l  s h e l t e r s ,  o r  4600 s h e l t e r s  i n  a l l .  The p r e f e r r e d  s i t e  
was t h e  G r e a t  Bas in  a r e a  of Nevada and Utah.  The s h e l t e r s  were  t o  be connec ted  
by c losed- loop  roads ,  hence t h e  name " r a c e t r a c k . "  I n  A p r i l  1980, t h e  " r a c e t r a c k "  
p l an  was modi f ied  i n  s e v e r a l  ways. 181 The new p l a n  would have  t h e  same number 
of s h e l t e r s  and m i s s i l e s ,  but  t h e  s h e l t e r s  would be a r r a y e d  a long  l i n e a r  roads .  
A s m a l l e r  t r a n s p o r t e r  v e h i c l e  would i n s e r t  t h e  m i s s i l e  and l aunche r  i n t o  t h e  
s h e l t e r .  T r a n s p o r t e r ,  l a u n c h e r ,  and m i s s i l e  would weigh 1.6 m i l l i o n  pounds. 
The sys tem would have  o n l y  a  l i m i t e d  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  move m i s s i l e s  i n t o  s h e l t e r s  
d u r i n g  a t t a c k .  To a i d  PLU, t h e  system would use  mass s i m u l a t o r s ,  500,000-lb 
a r c h e s  of s t e e l  and c o n c r e t e  t h a t  would mimic t h e  mass and o t h e r  s i g n a t u r e s  of 
171  U.S. White House. O f f i c e  of t h e  White  House P r e s s  S e c r e t a r y .  
~ r e s s % m o u n c e m e n t  by t he  P r e s i d e n t  on MX bas ing ,  Sept .  7 ,  1979. 4 p. 
181  T h i s  sys tem i s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  i n t r i c a t e  d e t a i l  i n  U.S. A i r  Force .  
A i r  F z c e  Systems Command. Headquar te rs  B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e  O f f i c e .  M-X 
H o r i z o n t a l  S h e l t e r  Weapon System: B a s e l i n e  C o n f i g u r a t i o n  (Dec. 1980).  
S e v e r a l  hundred pages. 
t h e  m i s s i l e / l a u n c h e r .  Mass s i m u l a t o r s  would be i n  each  s h e l t e r  and t h e  t r a n s -  
p o r t e r  v e h i c l e  whenever t h e y  d i d  n o t  c o n t a i n  a  m i s s i l e .  L i k e  t h e  " r a c e t r a c k , "  
t h e  new p l an  had s e v e r a l  f e a t u r e s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  SALT moni tor ing .  M i s s i l e s  
would be  assembled a t  a  d e s i g n a t e d  a r e a  n e a r  t h e  s h e l t e r s ,  and moved s lowly  
a long  a  s p e c i a l  road network t o  t h e  s h e l t e r s .  A l a r g e  e a r t h  mound, r e q u i r i n g  
a t  l e a s t  a  day t o  move, would be p l aced  a c r o s s  t h e  e n t r a n c e  t o  e a c h  c l u s t e r  of  
s h e l t e r s ;  s i n c e  t he  t r a n s p o r t e r  v e h i c l e s  could  not  t r a v e l  o f f  t h e  road ,  t h e  
mound would enhance S o v i e t  con f idence  t h a t  we were n o t  moving more m i s s i l e s  i n t o  
s h e l t e r s  c o v e r t l y .  S h e l t e r s  and t r a n s p o r t e r s  would have "SALT p o r t s , "  doors  
t h a t  could  be removed o r  opened t o  pe rmi t  S o v i e t  s a t e l l i t e s  t o  de t e rmine  t h a t  
a  c l u s t e r  con ta ined  a t  most one m i s s i l e .  
I n  normal o p e r a t i o n ,  t h e  m i s s i l e s  would be  moved pe rhaps  once  e a c h  s i x  
months from one s h e l t e r  t o  a n o t h e r  i n  a  c l u s t e r .  When r e q u i r e d ,  m i s s i l e s  would 
be moved from a  s h e l t e r  t o  t h e  c l u s t e r  maintenance f a c i l i t y  and back. To a v o i d  
i n d i c a t i n g  t o  t h e  S o v i e t s  which s h e l t e r s  c o n t a i n  m i s s i l e s ,  t h e  t r a n s p o r t e r  would 
s t o p  a t  a l l  s h e l t e r s  i n  a  c l u s t e r  whenever i t  s topped  a t  any.  Each s h e l t e r  
would c o n t a i n  e i t h e r  a  m i s s i l e  o r  a  s imu la to r .  A t  each  s h e l t e r ,  t h e  t r a n s p o r t e r  
would exchange i t s  s i m u l a t o r  f o r  one i n  t h e  s h e l t e r ,  i t s  s i m u l a t o r  f o r  t h e  
m i s s i l e / l a u n c h e r  i n  t he  s h e l t e r ,  o r  i t s  m i s s i l e / l a u n c h e r  f o r  t h e  s i m u l a t o r  i n  
t h e  s h e l t e r ,  a s  t h e  c a s e  might  be.  
The Case For MPS 
MPS advoca t e s  a rgue  t h a t  we need a  t r i a d  c o n t a i n i n g  land-based I C B M s  because 
of t h e  advantages  of t h e  t r i a d  and I C B M s  no ted  e a r l i e r .  MX must be t h e  ICBM we 
deploy because i t s  development i s  f a r  a l o n g  and i t s  c o u n t e r f o r c e  c a p a b i l i t y  i s  
e s s e n t i a l .  A sea- o r  a i r -based  MX would have s i m i l a r  v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s  a s  t h e  
submarine o r  bomber f l e e t ,  and MX1s l a r g e  s i z e  p r e v e n t s  i t  from be ing  f r e e l y  
mobile  on  l a n d .  Thus MX should  be  based  o n l y  i n  s i l o s  o r  MPS. S i l o s ,  however, 
a r e  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  S o v i e t  a t t a c k ,  and Congress  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  MX be su rv ivab ly  
based .  Thus MPS i s  t h e  o n l y  c h o i c e .  S u p p o r t e r s  a r g u e  t h a t  no o t h e r  sys tem 
bases  MX on l and  s u r v i v a b l y ,  v e r i f i a b l y ,  a f f o r d a b l y ,  i n  consonance w i t h  SALT, 
and w i t h  manageable s o c i a l  and env i ronmen ta l  impac ts .  
MPS r a i s e s  t h e  c o s t  of a  S o v i e t  a t t a c k .  To d e s t r o y  200 m i s s i l e s  d i s p e r s e d  
among 4600 s h e l t e r s ,  t h e y  would need a t  l e a s t  4600 R V s  i n s t e a d  of  200. They would 
need a t  l e a s t  23 R V s  t o  d e s t r o y  1 MX w i t h  i t s  10 R V s .  Without MPS, t hey  could 
d e s t r o y  most o f  o u r  2152 ICBM R V s  by u s i n g  1052 R V s  (one  f o r  e a c h  o f  1052 s i l o s ) ,  
about  25% of t h e i r  c o u n t e r f o r c e  RVs.  E/ With 4600 MPS, 350 Minuteman 111, 450 
Minuteman 11, and 52 T i t a n s ,  t h e y  would need 5452 c o u n t e r f o r c e  R V s  -- more t h a n  
they  now have -- t o  a t t a c k  our  3552 ICBM R V s  w i th  one RV pe r  s h e l t e r  o r  s i l o .  
Using two R V s  p e r  t a r g e t  doub le s  t h i s  c o s t .  MPS t h u s  c r e a t e s  a  poo r  exchange 
r a t i o  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t s .  S i n c e  we have f a r  more weapons on bombers and submarines 
t han  t h e y  do ,  a n  a t t a c k  on MX/MPS would l a r g e l y  d i s a rm t h e  a t t a c k e r ,  moving t h e  
p o s t a t t a c k  ba l ance  of R V s  s h a r p l y  i n  our  f avo r .  T h i s  consequence ho lds  w i t h  o r  
w i t h o u t  SALT even  i f  t h e y  a t t a c k  ou r  f o r c e s  i n  a  " b o l t  o u t  o f  t h e  b lue . "  (See  
f i g u r e  3 . )  Thus MPS d e t e r s  S o v i e t  a t t a c k ,  promoting s t r a t e g i c  s t a b i l i t y .  
While t h e y  cou ld  add R V s ,  we cou ld  add s h e l t e r s  t o  o f f s e t  them, and t h e  
r e s u l t  would be t h e  same -- they  would use  a l l  t h e i r  ICBMs t o  d e s t r o y  a l l  of 
ou r s .  I f  we were r e l u c t a n t  t o  b u i l d  thousands  of a d d i t i o n a l  s h e l t e r s ,  we could  
ach i eve  t h e  same l e v e r a g e  by defending  MPS wi th  t h e  Low A l t i t u d e  Defense ABM, 
19 /  John C o l l i n s  e s t i m a t e s  t h e  S o v i e t s  had  4,216 R V s  on  MIRVed SS-17, SS-18, 
and ~ F 1 9  I C B M s  a s  of January  1, 1981. U.S. L i b r a r y  of Congress.  Congress iona l  
Research  S e r v i c e .  U.S./Soviet M i l i t a r y  Balance:  S t a t i s t i c a l  T rends ,  1970-1980. 
Unpublished r e p o r t ,  by John C o l l i n s ,  J u l y  1981. p. 15. 
d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r .  Knowing they  could  g a i n  no advantage  by add ing  R V s ,  t hey  would 
be l e d  away from s o  doing  and toward mutua l  s t r a t e g i c  arms l i m i t a t i o n .  
FIGURE 3 
POST-EXCHANGE DAY-TO-DAY ALERT FORCES 
WlTH AND WITHOUT MX 
WITH SALT I1 LIMITS WITHOUT SALT I1 LIMITS 
Source:  U.S. Department o f  Defense.  Annual Repor t ,  F i s c a l  Year  1982. p. 59.  
MX w i l l  t h r e a t e n  S o v i e t  f i x e d - s i t e  I C B M s ,  s o  i t  should  compel t h e  S o v i e t s  
t o  spend l a r g e  sums on ICBM s u r v i v a b i l i t y ,  a s  t h e y  have  f o r c e d  u s  t o  do w i t h  
t h e i r  I C B M  program, f u r t h e r  p r e s s i n g  them t o  s eek  a n  e q u i t a b l e  arms c o n t r o l  
c e i l i n g .  Of cou r se ,  i f  t h e y  p l a n  t o  u s e  t h e i r  I C B M s  f o r  a  f i r s t  s t r i k e ,  t h e y  
need no t  respond,  but a  l a c k  of response  would i t s e l f  be t e l l i n g .  The funds 
t h e  S o v i e t s  spend on s u r v i v a b i l i t y  could o the rwi se  be used f o r  o t h e r  m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e s .  To compel t h i s  d i v e r s i o n  of  r e s o u r c e s ,  though,  MX must be  deployed.  
To p r e s e r v e  t h e  t r i a d  a s  we know i t ,  s u p p o r t e r s  a s s e r t ,  MX must be deployed on 
l and .  S e v e r a l  MPS c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  promote d e t e r r e n c e .  I t  w i l l  have v e r y  good 
command, c o n t r o l ,  and communication (C3), u s ing  s e v e r a l  modes f o r  redundancy. 
I t  w i l l  p e rmi t  s h e l t e r s  t h a t  s u r v i v e  a t t a c k  t o  endure  f o r  months. Because of  
t h e  accu racy ,  respons iveness  t o  n a t i o n a l  command a u t h o r i t y ,  t ime on t a r g e t  
c o n t r o l ,  and r a p i d  r e t a r g e t i n g  t h a t  MPS pe rmi t s ,  i t  maximizes M X ' s  w a r f i g h t i n g  
c a p a b i l i t y ,  which many advocates  of MPS s e e  a s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  d e t e r r e n c e .  
Some q u e s t i o n  o u r  a b i l i t y  t o  m a i n t a i n  PLU. But t h e  problem c u t s  b o t h  
ways, MPS s u p p o r t e r s  be l i eve .  Could t h e  S o v i e t s  r e a l l y  be s o  con f iden t  t hey  
had found a l l  t h e  m i s s i l e s  t h a t  t h e y  would r i s k  t h e i r  s u r v i v a l  a s  a  n a t i o n  on  
i t ?  J u s t  a s  we would not  know f o r  s u r e  i f  t h e  S o v i e t s  had broken PLU, n e i t h e r  
would they .  We w i l l  d evo te  e x t e n s i v e  r e s o u r c e s  t o  PLU. A s  we do f o r  o u r  
m i s s i l e  submarines now, we w i l l  have a  team of e x p e r t s ,  w i th  a c c e s s  t o  more 
i n fo rma t ion  t h a n  we expec t  t h e  S o v i e t s  cou ld  o b t a i n ,  t r y i n g  t o  b reak  PLU, and 
w i l l  a d j u s t  t h e  MPS system a s  needed t o  c o r r e c t  t he  problems they  d i scove r .  
MPS advoca t e s  r ecogn ize  t h a t  MPS w i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  deployment a r e a .  They 
a rgue ,  however, t h a t  on ly  33 squa re  s t a t u t e  mi l e s  of land  w i l l  be removed from 
p u b l i c  u s e ,  and t h e  A i r  Force  h a s  c a r e f u l l y  cons ide red  how t o  minimize s o c i a l  
and envi ronmenta l  impacts  of MPS. The m i s s i l e  should pose a s  few hazards  t o  
t h e  p u b l i c  a s  t h e  so l id - fue l ed  Minuteman h a s  i n  two decades  of  o p e r a t i o n .  
While advocates  recognize  t h a t  an  a t t a c k  on MPS would g e n e r a t e  b l a s t  and f a l l -  
o u t ,  t h e y  a rgue  t h a t  MPS w i l l  be v e r y  e f f e c t i v e  i n  d e t e r r i n g  a t t a c k .  Moreover, 
t h e  S o v i e t s  would not  j u s t  a t t a c k  MPS i n  a  f i r s t  s t r i k e ,  but  would a l s o  a t t a c k  
Minutemen, T i t a n s ,  bomber and submarine bases ,  and probably  C3 and o t h e r  m i l i -  
t a r y  t a r g e t s .  An a t t a c k  on MPS would cause r e l a t i v e l y  few a d d i t i o n a l  d e a t h s ,  
MPS s u p p o r t e r s  argue.  Some impacts  w i l l  be p o s i t i v e .  The p r o j e c t  w i l l  employ 
thousands d i r e c t l y  and i n d i r e c t l y ,  b r i n g i n g  b i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  i n t o  t h e  
deployment a r e a  and he lp ing  i t s  c i t i z e n s  r e t a i n  t h e i r  young people r a t h e r  t han  
l o s i n g  them a s  t h e y  m i g r a t e  e l s ewhere  f o r  jobs.  The p r o j e c t  w i l l  improve roads  
and w i l l  survey  water  and mine ra l  r e sou rces .  
The Case Agains t  MPS 
C r i t i c s  c h a l l e n g e  MPS on many grounds.  They n o t e  t h a t  enough MPS-based 
m i s s i l e s  can s u r v i v e  a t t a c k  on ly  i f  we b u i l d  enough s h e l t e r s .  Yet how can we 
know we have b u i l t  enough? The S o v i e t s  w i l l  a lways know i f  t h e y  c a n  d e s t r o y  
MPS because t hey  know how many R V s  t h e y  have and how many s h e l t e r s  we bu i ld .  
While we have i n d i c a t i o n s  of numbers of  S o v i e t  R V s ,  however, we c a n  neve r  know 
p r e c i s e l y .  MPS g ives  t h e  S o v i e t s  an  i n c e n t i v e  t o  deny u s  t h a t  knowledge. By 
b u i l d i n g  I C B M s  c o v e r t l y ,  a s  t h e y  can  do under  SALT I and IT, and making provi -  
s i o n s  t o  launch  them wi thout  s i l o s ,  t hey  could a v e r t  a  U.S. i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
number of  s h e l t e r s ,  s o  cou ld  minimize t h e  number of  R V s  needed t o  d e s t r o y  MPS. 
C i t i n g  r e c e n t  U.S. i n t e l l i g e n c e  e s t i m a t e s  r ega rd ing  t h e  S o v i e t  t h r e a t  i n  
1990, c r i t i c s  n o t e  t h a t  even  w i t h o u t  c o v e r t  deployment of  I C B M s  we may need more 
t han  4600 s h e l t e r s .  20,' OTA has  e s t ima ted  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  could  (assuming no - 
SALT I1 c e i l i n g s )  deploy 7,000 R V s  i n  1990 and 12,000 i n  1995 f o r  u s e  s o l e l y  
a g a i n s t  MPS. To permit  100 MX t o  s u r v i v e ,  we would need 360 MX and 8,250 
s h e l t e r s  i n  1990 and 550 MX and 12,500 s h e l t e r s  i n  1995. 211  -
201 Garn and L a x a l t ,  MX Basing and a  N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  P o s t u r e  f o r  t h e  
u n i t e d s t a t e s ,  p. 3 .  
211 OTA, YX M i s s i l e  Basing: Summary, p. 18.  -
Moreover, OTA s t a t e s ,  we would need t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  s i z e  of  t h e  S o v i e t  f o r c e  
s e v e r a l  y e a r s  i n  advance. We "could - n o t  f i r s t  b u i l d  a  4 ,600 - she l t e r  system and 
then  d e c i d e  t o  expand i t  i f  i t  proved t o  be  t o o  smal!., u n l e s s  t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  
were prepared  t o  d e f e r  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  i n t o  t h e  mid-1990's." - 221 To make m a t t e r s  
more d i f f i c u l t ,  we a r e  s t a r t i n g  t h e  r a c e  from behind.  C r i t i c s  contend  t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t s  could  " f r a c t i o n a t e "  t h e  payloads on t h e i r  ICBMs -- t h a t  i s ,  d i v i d e  t h e  
payload i n t o  l a r g e r  numbers of  lower-y ie ld  RVs. The S o v i e t s  have  t e s t e d  t h e i r  
l a r g e s t  ICBM,  t h e  SS-18, w i th  a  maximum of 10 RVs.  I f  t hey  conducted enough 
f l i g h t  t e s t s  s o  t h a t  we b e l i e v e d  t h e y  cou ld  deploy  a  20-RV SS-18 w i t h  adequate  
l e t h a l i t y  a g a i n s t  hard t a r g e t s ,  we could r e t a i n  conf idence  i n  MPS on ly  by 
i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  number of s h e l t e r s  d r a m a t i c a l l y ,  deploying  ABM, o r  bo th .  
C r i t i c s  of MPS q u e s t i o n  our  a b i l i t y  t o  p re se rve  l o c a t i o n  u n c e r t a i n t y .  231 
Guy Barasch ,  o f  Los Alamos N a t i o n a l  Labora tory ,  f e e l s  t h a t  w h i l e  we can  main- 
t a i n  PLU i n  t h e  1980s,  "I have concerns  about  20 o r  25 y e a r s  from now." %/ 
A f t e r  a l l ,  PLU w i l l  be  cha l l enged  by S o v i e t  t echnology of  1990 and beyond, when 
MX/MPS would be o p e r a t i o n a l .  We would never  know, of cou r se ,  i f  we had main- 
t a i n e d  PLU. C r i t i c s  f e a r  t h a t  doub t s  abou t  PLU and unwi l l i ngness  t o  u s e  ever -  
expanding amounts of land  w i l l  compel u s  t o  deploy an ABM t o  defend MPS. T h i s  
could  l e a d  u s  t o  a b r o g a t e  t h e  ABM T r e a t y ,  which many s e e  a s  t h e  most u s e f u l  
arms c o n t r o l  agreement n e g o t i a t e d  t o  da t e .  Even i f  t h e  S o v i e t s  a g r e e  t o  modify 
t h e  t r e a t y  t o  pe rmi t  MPS-defense ABM, c r i t i c s  f e a r ,  such  r e n e g o t i a t i o n  would 
be t h e  beginning  of t h e  end of t h e  t r e a t y .  
22/  I b i d . ,  p. 19 .  I t a l i c s  i n  o r i g i n a l .  -
231 Garn and L a x a l t ,  MX Basing and a  Na t iona l  S e c u r i t y  P o s t u r e  f o r  t h e  
L J n i t e T ~ t a t e s ,  p. 4 .  
24/  U.S. L i b r a r y  of Congress .  Congress iona l  Research  S e r v i c e .  Redress- 
ing  ICBM V u l n e r a b i l i t y :  Opt ions  f o r  t h e  Future .  Seminar T r a n s c r i p t .  Report  
Yo. 81-157 F.  Washington, March 23,  1981. p. 30. 
MPS o f f e r s  t h e  S o v i e t s  s e v e r a l  advan tages ,  c r i t i c s  a rgue .  F i r s t ,  i t  p l a y s  
t o  t h e i r  s t r a t e g y  and inves tment .  Three- four ths  of S o v i e t  d e l i v e r a b l e  s t r a t e g i c  
n u c l e a r  weapons a r e  on I C B M s ,  G/ many of which can  r e a d i l y  d e s t r o y  t h e  f i x e d  
t a r g e t s  t h a t  MPS provides  by t h e  thousands.  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  a  sys tem i n  which 
v e h i c l e s  c a r r y  m i s s i l e s  o v e r  l a r g e  a r e a s ,  such  a s  on t h e  U.S. highway sys tem,  
would r ende r  S o v i e t  I C B M s  of l i t t l e  v a l u e  by removing most of t h e i r  t a r g e t s .  
Second, t h e  S o v i e t s  would have advan tages  i n  a n  MPS vs .  MPS compe t i t i on .  They 
have much more s p a r s e l y  popula ted  land  and no comparable r e s t r a i n t s  on envi ron-  
menta l  impact.  They can c l o s e  o f f  v a s t  a r e a s  t o  h e l p  PLIJ. They c a n  b u i l d  a l l  
s o r t s  of t h i n g s  i n  q u a n t i t y  r a p i d l y .  T h i r d ,  how c o n f i d e n t l y  cou ld  we v e r i f y  
a  Sov ie t  MPS? Four th ,  a  U.S. commitment t o  MPS would compel U.S. SALT nego t i -  
a t o r s  t o  seek  l i m i t s  on S o v i e t  ICBM R V s  t o  keep MX/MPS s u r v i v a b l e .  The S o v i e t s  
could  t h e n  e x a c t  major  conces s ions  from t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  i n  exchange f o r  t h e s e  
l i m i t s .  
C r i t i c s  n o t e  s o c i a l  and envi ronmenta l  problems. I n  May 1981,  t h e  Mormon 
Church, of which more than  70% of Utahns a r e  members, expressed  g rave  concern 
about  t h e  s h o r t a g e  of  wa te r ,  t h e  s o c i a l  consequences of  a n  " i n f l u x  of  t e n s  of 
thousands of temporary workers and t h e i r  f a m i l i e s , "  t h e  impact  on " t h e  f r a g i l e  
ecology of  t h e  a r e a . "  The s t a t emen t  po in t ed  o u t  t h a t  a n  a t t a c k  on MX/MPS would 
cause  "near  a n n i h i l a t i o n  of most of what we have s t r i v e n  t o  b u i l d , "  and f a l l o u t  
r each ing  " a c r o s s  much of  t h e  n a t i o n . "  The re fo re ,  i t  a sked  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n  f i n d  
" v i a b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s . "  E/ Ranchers ,  I n d i a n s ,  e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t s ,  and o t h e r s  
have exp res sed  s i m i l a r  concerns .  O the r  l a r g e  p r o j e c t s  a r e  a l s o  planned f o r  
25/  U.S. Department of  Defense.  Annual Repor t ,  F i s c a l  Year  1981. 
( ~ a r o z  Brown, S e c r e t a r y  of Defense)  Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  
1980. p. 89. 
26 /  Church of  J e s u s  C h r i s t  o f  Latter-Day S a i n t s .  F i r s t  P re s idency  
s t a t e m e n t  on Basing t h e  MX M i s s i l e .  S a l t  Lake C i t y ,  Utah,  May 5 ,  1981. 3 p. 
Nevada and Utah in the 1980s, such as power plants, mines, and perhaps synthetic 
fuel plants. Their cumulative effects along with MX would be immense. 
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF BASING MX ON LAND 
MPS is by far the most controversial basing scheme seriously put forth for 
a strategic weapon system. Many advocates of MX survivably based on land oppose 
MPS, so are compelled to offer alternatives. Three leading ones are a scaled- 
down MPS, ABM defense of MPS- or silo-based MX, and launch on warning. 
S caled-Dawn MPS 
The Reagan Administration is reportedly considering a 100-MX/1000-~~ system, 
which would offset two difficulties of the larger system. The 200-MX/4600-~~~ 
system has been widely criticized because of its social and environmental impacts. 
Moreover, it would cost $40.7 billion (FY82 $ )  for acquisition (research, develop- 
ment, test, evaluation, and procurement of missiles and basing mode), requiring 
expenditures (in then-year $)  of about $5.9 billion in FY83, $8.3 billion in FY84, 
$10.4 billion in FY85, and $10.5 billion in FY86 - 271. The small MPS, in contrast, 
would cost $28.7 billion (FY82 $ )  for acquisition. 281 It would have fewer 
adverse impacts. 
There is little disagreement that the smaller system by itself would be 
extraordinarily cost-ineffective. An Air Force planning guide, assuming SALT I1 
limits, was that the number of accurate Soviet ICBM RVs available to be targeted 
271 U.S. Air Force. Off ice of the Special Assistant for MX Matters. 
~ele~hone conversation, Sept. 16, 1981. 
281 Ibid. This is a preliminary estimate. -
a t  HX would not  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  exceed 2700 by t h e  MX/MPS f u l l  o p e r a t i o n a l  capab i l -  
i t y  of  1989. OTA assumes t h e  damage expec tancy  of each  o f  t h e s e  R V s  i s  0.85; 291 
t h a t  i s ,  each  RV t a r g e t e d  a t  a  s h e l t e r  w i l l  have an  85% chance of d e s t r o y i n g  i t .  
Using t h e s e  f i g u r e s ,  i f  t h e  S o v i e t s  t a r g e t  2  R V s  on e a c h  o f  t h e  1000 s h e l t e r s ,  
t hen  15% of 15%, o r  2.25%, of t h e  s h e l t e r s  (22.5 s h e l t e r s )  would s u r v i v e .  Worse, 
s i n c e  t h e  S o v i e t s  would i n  t h i s  a t t a c k  t a r g e t  2  R V s  a t  e a c h  s h e l t e r  c o n t a i n i n g  
a  m i s s i l e ,  on ly  2  (nominal ly 2.25) MX m i s s i l e s  would be expec ted  t o  s u r v i v e ,  a t  
a  c o s t  o f  $14.5 b i l l i o n  a p i e c e .  The 900 empty s h e l t e r s  would buy z e r o  a d d i t i o n a l  
s u r v i v a b i l i t y ;  s i n c e  t h e  S o v i e t s  could  a t t a c k  each MX w i t h  2  R V s ,  what t hey  
d i d  t o  t h e  o t h e r  900 s h e l t e r s  would n o t  a f f e c t  numbers of  MXs s u r v i v i n g .  When 
t h e r e  a r e  enough s h e l t e r s  s o  t h e  S o v i e t s  can t a r g e t  on ly  one RV a t  each  s h e l t e r ,  
MPS enhances s u r v i v a b i l i t y  modest ly.  Only when s h e l t e r s  g r e a t l y  outnumber S o v i e t  
a c c u r a t e  ICBM R V s ,  s o  t hey  cannot  a t t a c k  most s h e l t e r s  and m i s s i l e s ,  does  MPS 
enhance s u r v i v a b i l i t y  s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  
Proponents  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  s m a l l  MPS l e t s  u s  do something now, and p r o v i d e s  
f u t u r e  o p t i o n s ,  whereas doing no th ing  now would k i l l  MX and f o r e c l o s e  m i t i g a t i n g  
t h e  I C B M  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  problem d u r i n g  t h i s  decade. I n  p r o v i d i n g  a  way of 
deploying  MX, i t  would compel t h e  S o v i e t s  t o  spend v a s t  sums t o  make t h e i r  I C B M s  
s u r v i v a b l e ,  w h i l e  keeping them o f f  guard  a s  t o  t h e  composi t ion  of  t h e  f u t u r e  
U.S. ICBM fo rce .  T h i s  would put  p o s i t i v e  p r e s s u r e  on them a t  SALT. F u r t h e r ,  
i t  would s a t i s f y  West European governments t h a t  would f i n d  i t  p o l i t i c a l l y  impos- 
s i b l e  t o  accep t  U.S. t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  f o r c e s  on t h e i r  s o i l  i f  we do not  base  MX 
on l and .  The s m a l l  system i s  a  c o n s e r v a t i v e  i n i t i a l  s t e p  t h a t  m a i n t a i n s  f l e x i -  
b i l i t y .  Our expe r i ence  w i t h  i t  would assuage  concerns  on MPS o p e r a b i l i t y  and 
29/  OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Basing: Summary, p. 17'. -
PLU. It  hedges a g a i n s t  t h e  f a i l u r e  of s e v e r a l  o t h e r  o p t i o n s  because i t  a l l ows  
u s  t o  make inc remen ta l  d e c i s i o n s  w h i l e  R&D c o n t i n u e s  on complementary o p t i o n s .  
I t  would provide  l eve rage  t h a t  would i n c r e a s e  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and lower t h e  
t e c h n i c a l  r i s k  of  an  ABM. I t  cou ld  complement a  l a t e r  deployment of a  deep 
underground bas ing  system t h a t  s t r e s s e s  t h e  S o v i e t s  i n  an  o p p o s i t e  manner from 
MPS. Deep underground b a s i n g  would be  t a r g e t e d  w i t h  l a r g e  weapons, t h e r e b y  
r e q u i r i n g  few RVs per  ICBM,  whereas t h e  S o v i e t s  must use  many R V s  pe r  I C B M  t o  
ho ld  MPS a t  r i s k .  
C r i t i c s  respond t h a t  we would dece ive  o u r s e l v e s  w i t h  t h e  s m a l l  YPS. A 
sma l l  MPS keeps us of f  guard about  t h e  f u t u r e  composi t ion of our  ICBM f o r c e .  
We must e i t h e r  commit t o  a  much l a r g e r  system, and t o  expanding a n d / o r  defend- 
i ng  i t  i f  t h e  Sov ie t  t h r e a t  r e q u i r e s ,  o r  no t  deploy an  MPS. I n  f a c t ,  c r i t i c s  
b e l i e v e ,  a  s m a l l  MPS i n v i t e s  t h e  S o v i e t s  t o  engage u s  i n  a n  RV vs .  MPS r a c e  by 
demonst ra t ing  t h a t  MPS has s o  l i t t l e  p o l i t i c a l  suppor t  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  
i s  u n w i l l i n g  even t o  s t a r t  t h e  r a c e ,  l e t  a l o n e  s t a y  t h e  cou r se .  Nor should  we 
b u i l d  a  s m a l l  WS i n  t h e  hopes t h a t  an  ABM could e x p l o i t  t h e  l e v e r a g e  provided 
by de fend ing  o n l y  t h e  100 s h e l t e r s  w i t h  m i s s i l e s  i n  them. OTA s t a t e s  t h a t  
whi le  LOAD would not  need t o  be very  e f f i c i e n t  t o  f o r c e  t h e  S o v i e t s  t o  use 
two R V s  p e r  s h e l t e r ,  " i t  would be exceed ing ly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e x a c t  a  p r i c e  of  
s e v e r a l  R V s , "  and i t  i s  f a r  t o o  soon i n  t h e  development c y c l e  t o  r e l y  on t h e  
more advanced l a y e r e d  de fense  ABM. 301 (See below.) F i n a l l y ,  c r i t i c s  c i t e  
OTA on t h e  need f o r  a  t imely  d e c i s i o n  on t h e  numbers of s h e l t e r s  t o  be b u i l t  
(page  2 2 )  and Congress iona l  Budget O f f i c e  on t h e  " i n d i v i s i b i l i t y "  of  t h e  s i z e  
of an MPS system (page 15).  
301 U.S. Congress. Off i c e  of  Technology Assessment. MX M i s s i l e  Basing. 
~ a s h i G t o n ,  U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Off . ,  Sept .  1981. ( H e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  a s  "OTA, 
MX M i s s i l e  Basing. ") p. 121 ,  132 ,  135. 
A n t i b a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e  Defense of MX 
The United S t a t e s  cou ld  deve lop  and deploy  a n t i b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  (ABMs) t o  
defend MPS- o r  s i lo -based  MX ( o r  o t h e r  ICBMs). There a r e  s e v e r a l  t y p e s  of ABM 
systems.  The c h o i c e  depends on when t h e  system i s  t o  be deployed  ( a  more 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  ABM could  be used l a t e r )  and t h e  bas ing  mode i n  which MX i s  t o  be 
defended.  S ince  t h e  SALT I ABM T r e a t y  of  1972 s h a r p l y  l i m i t s  ABM development 
and deployment, t he  United S t a t e s  would have t o  seek  r e n e g o t i a t i o n  of t h e  t r e a t y  
o r ,  f a i l i n g  t h a t ,  would have t o  withdraw from t h e  t r e a t y  i n  o r d e r  t o  deploy  most 
m i l i t a r i l y  e f f e c t i v e  t ypes  of  ABM. 
Low A l t i t u d e  Defense (LoAD) 
T h i s  i s  an  ABM sys tem c u r r e n t l y  under  development and i s  t h e  most r a p i d l y  
deployable  U.S. ABM. I t  i s  des igned  t o  defend MX/MPS, not  s i l o -based  m i s s i l e s .  
I t  would i n t e r c e p t  R V s  a t  v e r y  low a l t i t u d e s ,  a  few k i l o m e t e r s .  %/ I t  would 
use a  n u c l e a r  warhead i n  t h e  low k i l o t o n  range. A LoAD u n i t  would r e p o r t e d l y  
c o n t a i n  3  m i s s i l e s ,  321 a  r a d a r ,  and a computer,  and cou ld  f i t  i n t o  a n  MX 
s h e l t e r .  I n  a  t y p i c a l  LoAD engagement, l e s s  t han  10 seconds would e l a p s e  from 
t h e  t ime t h e  LoAD r a d a r s  d e t e c t  a n  RV u n t i l  t h e  i n t e r c e p t o r s  d e s t r o y  t h e  RV. 331 
Because of t h e  s h o r t  range of LoAD m i s s i l e s ,  t h e  LoAD u n i t  must be i n  an  MPS 
s h e l t e r  nea r  t h e  one c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  MX, s o  must be  mobi le .  
311 U.S. Los Alamos S c i e n t i f i c  Labora tory .  Qu ick  Look Assessment of  
~ a l l i z i c  M i s s i l e  Defense. June  1980. Repr in ted  i n  Congres s iona l  Record (Dai ly  
E d i t i o n ) ,  June  6 ,  1980: S 6434. Another  a r t i c l e  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  m i s s i l e  would 
i n t e r c e p t  a t  about  7,000 f t  a l t i t u d e .  Admin i s t r a t i on  Weighing Opt ions  i n  MX 
Basing Plan .  Av ia t ion  Week and Space Technology, Sep t .  7 ,  1981: 22. 
32 /  I b i d .  -
33/ Los Alamos S c i e n t i f i c  Labora to ry ,  Quick Look Assessment of  B a l l i s t i c  -
M i s s i l e  Defense. Congress iona l  Record (Da i ly  ~ d i t i o n ) ,  June  6 ,  1980: S6434. 
LoAD could  defend MX/MF'S e f f e c t i v e l y ,  advoca t e s  c l a i m ,  because  i t  would 
need t o  i n t e r c e p t  o n l y  t h o s e  R V s  headed f o r  s h e l t e r s  c o n t a i n i n g  M X s  o r  LoAD 
u n i t s  ( p r e f e r e n t i a l  d e f e n s e ) .  To t a k e  a  h y p o t h e t i c a l  example, i f  t h e  S o v i e t s  
use  23  RVs t o  a t t a c k  a l l  2 3  s h e l t e r s  i n  a n  MX c l u s t e r  c o n t a i n i n g  one MX and 
one LoAD m i s s i l e ,  t h e  d e f e n s e ,  by u s ing  t h e  LoAD m i s s i l e  t o  i n t e r c e p t  t h e  RV 
headed f o r  t h e  M X ,  d e f e a t s  t h e  a t t a c k .  S t i l l  n o t  knowing t h e  l o c a t i o n  of  t h e  
MX, t h e  S o v i e t s  would need t o  expend a n o t h e r  23 RVs (one  pe r  s h e l t e r )  t o  de- 
s t r o y  t h e  s h e l t e r  w i t h  t h e  m i s s i l e .  T h i s  l e v e r a g e ,  a d v o c a t e s  a r g u e ,  enhances 
d e t e r r e n c e  by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  c o s t  and r i s k  t o  t he  S o v i e t  Union of l aunch ing  a  
f i r s t  s t r i k e .  While add ing  MPS s h e l t e r s  would p rov ide  t h e  same l e v e r a g e ,  advo- 
c a t e s  c l a im  LoAD i s  l e s s  c o s t l y ,  more r a p i d l y  deployed,  and l e s s  d i s r u p t i v e  t o  
t h e  environment .  They contend  t h a t  "shoot-look-shoot" t a c t i c s ,  where t h e  
S o v i e t s  a t t a c k  MPS, then  use  s a t e l l i t e  o r  ground s e n s o r  d a t a  t o  de te rmine  which 
s h e l t e r s  s u r v i v e d ,  t h e n  a t t a c k  o n l y  s u r v i v i n g  s h e l t e r s ,  a r e  u n r e a l i s t i c .  The 
S o v i e t s  could  no t  depend on t h e i r  s a t e l l i t e s  o r  ground s e n s o r s  s u r v i v i n g  o r  n o t  
be ing  jammed, and t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  c o u l d  l aunch  I C B M s  between t h e  f i r s t  and 
second waves. 
Proponents  c l a i m  t h a t  i t  i s  q u i t e  f e a s i b l e  t o  b u i l d  a n  e f f e c t i v e  LoAD a s  
long  a s  i t  u s e s  n u c l e a r  warheads,  w i t h  i n i t i a l  deployment p o s s i b l e  i n  t h e  mid- 
1980s.  - 3 4 1  They a s s e r t  t h a t  a n  expanded S o v i e t  t h r e a t  t o  MX/MPS c o u l d  be o f f s e t  
f a r  more cheaply  w i th  LoAD t h a n  w i t h  many more s h e l t e r s .  
Proponents  b e l i e v e  LoAD would enhance d e t e r r e n c e .  S i n c e  i t  c o u l d  o n l y  
defend I C B M s ,  no t  c i t i e s ,  i t  would lower S o v i e t  con f idence  i n  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  
d e s t r o y  ou r  I C B M s  p r eempt ive ly  w h i l e  n o t  a f f e c t i n g  t h e i r  con f idence  i n  t h e i r  
a b i l i t y  t o  r e t a l i a t e  a g a i n s t  U.S. c i t i e s  i n  response  t o  a  U.S. first s t r i k e .  
3 4 1  I b i d .  - 
C r i t i c s  cha rge  t h a t  LoAD would have  ex t r eme ly  s e r i o u s  o p e r a t i o n a l  problems. 
They q u e s t i o n  i f  we could  have con f idence  t h a t  LoAD could  f o r c e  t h e  S o v i e t s  t o  
u se  more t h a n  2  R V s  p e r  s h e l t e r .  OTA f i n d s  i t  would be  d i f f i c u l t  t o  make LOAD 
a b l e  t o  s u r v i v e  and o p e r a t e  w i t h  n u c l e a r  exp los ions  a  m i l e  o r  s o  away. =/ LOAD 
compounds t h e  problem o f  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of l o c a t i o n  u n c e r t a i n t y  (PLU) f o r  MPS. 
LoAD would r e q u i r e  t h e  same obse rvab le  f e a t u r e s  a s  MX and mass s i m u l a t o r s ,  but  
s i n c e  LoAD i s  a  " f u n c t i o n a l  o b j e c t , "  OTA n o t e s ,  "PLU would become c o n s i d e r a b l y  
more complex i f  [LOAD] were added t o  MX/MPS." - 36/ S ince  t h e  LOAD u n i t  would be 
i n  a  s h e l t e r  n e a r  t h e  MX, c r i t i c s  a r g u e ,  i f  t h e  S o v i e t s  cou ld  l o c a t e  LoAD u n i t s  
they  would narrow t h e  l o c a t i o n  of t h e  m i s s i l e s  t o  w i t h i n  a  few s h e l t e r s .  They 
could  t h e n  overwhelm t h o s e  s h e l t e r s  w i t h  s e v e r a l  R V s  a p i e c e ,  u s i n g  fewer  R V s  
t han  would be needed t o  d e s t r o y  an  undefended MPS. Ben Plymale,  a former 
Deputy D i r e c t o r  of  Defense Research and Eng inee r ing ,  w r o t e  t h a t  "LoAD was n o t  
des igned  t o  engage a  r e spons ive  S o v i e t  t h r e a t ,  which might i n c l u d e  maneuvering 
R V 1 s ,  a n t i - r a d i a t i o n  homing R V 1 s ,  jammers, decoys,  o r  a myriad of  o t h e r  poten- 
t i a l  countermeasures."  x/ 
A f u l l  LoAD de fense  of  MX/MPS i s  c l e a r l y  f o r b i d d e n  by t h e  ABM T r e a t y ,  a s  
i t  would use  ABM l aunche r s  and r a d a r s  not  of  "permanent f i x e d  t y p e s , "  and f o r  
o t h e r  reasons .  The t r e a t y  might pe rmi t  deployment of 100 LoAD m i s s i l e s  u s i n g  
f i x e d  u n i t s  near  Grand Forks ,  North Dakota, t h e  only  ABM s i t e  pe rmi t t ed  t h e  
U.S. by t h e  t r e a t y ,  bu t  t h i s  would s u r e l y  n o t  be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e .  
35/  OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Bas ing ,  p. 113 ,  122-123. -
36/  OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Basing: Summary, p. 27. -
37/  Plymale, Ben. I s s u e  Papers .  Congress iona l  Record ( D a i l y  E d i t i o n ) ,  -
Sept .  10 ,  1981: E 4151. 
Layered Defense 
Another  t y p e  of ABM c o u l d  b e  u sed  t o  de fend  s i l o -based  I C B M s .  T h i s  system, 
c a l l e d  l a y e r e d  d e f e n s e ,  would have two t i e r s .  An "ove r l ay"  of long-range 
m i s s i l e s ,  e a c h  w i t h  m u l t i p l e  nonnuc l ea r  warheads,  would i n t e r c e p t  R V s  i n  s p a c e ,  
above 300,000 f t .  T h i s  o v e r l a y  i s  i n  e a r l y  expe r imen ta l  s t a g e s .  The "under lay"  
i s  s imply  LoAD o r  a  s i m i l a r  system. Any m i l i t a r i l y  u s e f u l  l a y e r e d  d e f e n s e  i s  
f o r b i d d e n  by t h e  ABM T r e a t y .  
E i t h e r  l a y e r  by i t s e l f  would have  g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  de fend ing  s i l o -based  
I C B M s .  S i n c e  s i l o s  would o f f e r  on ly  a  f r a c t i o n  of t h e  a impo in t s  of MPS, t h e  
S o v i e t s  cou ld  c o n c e n t r a t e  many R V s  a g a i n s t  each  s i l o .  Even i f  t h e  o v e r l a y  c o u l d  
d e s t r o y  most a t t a c k i n g  R V s ,  t h e  IJni ted S t a t e s  would have t o  assume t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t s  cou ld  u s e  s o  many R V s  t h a t  enough would l e a k  t h rough  and  d e s t r o y  most 
s i l o s .  A t  t h e  same t ime,  t h e  S o v i e t s  could  probably  d e f e a t  a  LOAD-only de fense  
by u s i n g  a  p r e c i s e l y  c o o r d i n a t e d  a t t a c k  w i t h  many R V s  and s p e c i a l  t a c t i c s .  
Toge the r ,  however, t h e  o v e r l a y  could  break  up t h e  a t t a c k  i n  space ,  making t h e  
S o v i e t s  unab l e  t o  r e l y  on  R V s  r e a c h i n g  LoAD i n  v a s t  numbers w i t h  p r e c i s e  coord i -  
n a t i o n ,  wh i l e  t h e  unde r l ay ,  f a c i n g  a  ragged and weakene6 a t t a c k ,  could  i n t e r c e p t  
many remain ing  R V s  headed f o r  s i l o s .  
I n  t h i s  way, l a y e r e d  d e f e n s e  would s e e k  t o  compensate f o r  t h e  l e v e r a g e  l o s t  
by u s ing  s i l o s  r a t h e r  t han  MPS. Advocates c i t e  by way of example t h a t  i f  each  
l a y e r  cou ld  i n t e r c e p t  80% of  t h e  a t t a c k i n g  R V s ,  t h e n  o n l y  4 %  ( 2 0 %  of  20%)  would 
l e a k  through,  s o  t h a t  two modera te ly  " l eaky"  l a y e r s  could  t o g e t h e r  i n t e r c e p t  
most RVs. 381 Using s e v e r a l  nonnuclear  warheads p e r  o v e r l a y  i n t e r c e p t o r  m i s s i l e  
381  Donald Brennan used  t h i s  example i n  BMD P o l i c y  I s s u e s  f o r  t h e  1980s ,  
i n  ~ c h n e i d e r ,  Wil l iam, J r . ,  e t  a l .  U.S. S t r a t eg i c -Nuc lea r  P o l i c y  and 
B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e  Defense:  The 1980s and Beyond. Cambridge, Mass., I n s t i t u t e  
f o r  Fo re ign  P o l i c y  Ana lys i s ,  I n c . ,  1980; sponsored by t h e  U.S. Army B a l l i s t i c  
M i s s i l e  Defense Advanced Technology Cen te r .  p. 20.  
and perhaps c o n c e n t r a t i n g  i n t e r c e p t o r s  t o  defend c e r t a i n  s i l o s  wh i l e  l eav ing  
o t h e r  s i l o s  undefended ( p r e f e r e n t i a l  d e f e n s e )  c o u l d  a l s o  i n c r e a s e  l e v e r a g e .  
C r i t i c s  a s s e r t  t h a t  t h i s  leakage  example i s  mis leading .  S i l o  bas ing  lowers 
our  c o s t  of  bas ing  MX,  bu t  a l s o  l ower s  t h e  number of  aim p o i n t s  t h e  S o v i e t s  must 
t a r g e t .  I f  they  could t a r g e t  2700 R V s  on MX, they  could  i n  t heo ry  devo te  13-14 
X V s  t o  each  of  200 s i l o s .  Un le s s  bo th  ABM l a y e r s  a r e  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  good, con- 
c e n t r a t e d  a t t a c k s  u s ing  c l e v e r  t a c t i c s  would have a  ve ry  good chance of des t roy-  
i n g  a  s i l o .  OTA c i t e s  a n  example i n  which t h e  o v e r l a y  c a n  d e s t r o y  any  a t t a c k i n g  
RV it t a r g e t s  85% of t h e  time and t h e  o f f e n s e  sends 8 R V s  per  s i l o .  The ove r l ay  
would d e s t r o y  a l l  t h e  R V s  o n l y  27% o f  t h e  t i m e  (0.85 t o  t h e  e i g h t h  power). I f  
t h e  unde r l ay  could d e s t r o y  t h e  f i r s t  RV r each ing  i t  70% of t h e  t ime ,  and t h e  
second 50% of t h e  t ime,  t h e n  a  defended s i l o  h a s  a  62% chance  of  s u r v i v i n g .  The 
r e s u l t s  a r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  ove r l ay  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  I f  t he  o v e r l a y  can  d e s t r o y  65% 
of t h e  R V s  and t h e  unde r l ay  h a s  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  s t a t e d  above ,  t h e n  a  defended  
s i l o  has only  a  22% chance of su rv iv ing .  - 39/ 
Opinion i s  s h a r p l y  d i v i d e d  on t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  o v e r l a y  f e a s i b i l i t y .  Advo- 
c a t e s  recognize  t h a t  t h e  ove r l ay  f a c e s  more d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a n  does  LOAD. They 
a r g u e ,  however, t h a t  t h e  technology r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  o v e r l a y  i s ,  o r  soon  w i l l  
be, a v a i l a b l e .  C r i t i c s  a r e  extremely p e s s i m i s t i c .  They b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  needed 
technology i s  v e r y  d i s t a n t  and t h a t  t h e  o v e r l a y  canno t  work a g a i n s t  a  mass ive  
S o v i e t  a t t a c k .  C r i t i c s  and those  involved  i n  ABM development would a g r e e  w i th  
OTA'S assessment  t h a t  "For t h e  moment, i t  would be q u i t e  r i s k y  t o  r e l y  on t h e  
Overlay,  o r  on l aye red  de fense ,  a s  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  IX bas ing ."  401 -
39/  OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Bas ing ,  p. 132-134. -
40/  OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Basing: Summary, p. 32. -
Some a d v o c a t e s  hope t h a t  l a y e r e d  d e f e n s e  o r  a  more advanced  ABM c o u l d  de- 
f e n d  c i t i e s  a g a i n s t  l i m i t e d  a t t a c k s .  They b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  U.S. p o l i c y  o f  de- 
t e r r i n g  n u c l e a r  war by h a v i n g  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n s  of bo th  s i d e s  h o s t a g e  t o  a t t a c k  
i s  immora l ,  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  s h o u l d  d e f e n d  i t s  c i t i z e n s  r a t h e r  t h a n  k i l l  
R u s s i a n s ,  and t h a t  S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  programs a r e  r a p i d l y  removing t h e  m u t u a l i t y  
o f  m u t u a l  a s s u r e d  d e s t r u c t i o n .  They t h u s  b e l i e v e  t h e  U.S. s h o u l d  w i t h d r a w  from 
t h e  ABM T r e a t y  and b u i l d  l a y e r e d  d e f e n s e  and more advanced ABMs t o  l i m i t  damage 
i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  w a r .  C r i t i c s  c o n t e n d  t h e  m u t u a l  h o s t a g e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  t h e  
o n l y  one f e a s i b l e :  With t o d a y ' s  huge n u c l e a r  a r s e n a l s  t h e  S o v i e t s  know t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c o u l d  r e t a l i a t e  w i t h  d e v a s t a t i n g  e f f e c t  e v e n  a f t e r  a b s o r b i n g  a  
f i r s t  s t r i k e .  They t h u s  s e e  p e r p e t u a t i o n  o f  t h e  ABM T r e a t y  a s  d e s i r a b l e  t o  
p r e s e r v e  d e t e r r e n c e  and a v o i d  a  r a c e  between ABMs and  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  i n  
which b o t h  s i d e s  would spend l a r g e  sums w i t h o u t  improving s e c u r i t y .  They view 
l a y e r e d  d e f e n s e  a s  b r e a c h i n g  t h e  s p i r i t  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  l e t t e r  o f  t h e  ABM T r e a t y .  
S imple  Systems 
S e v e r a l  a n a l y s t s  o u t s i d e  DOD h a v e  p roposed  c h e a p  low-technology s y s t e m s  t o  
d e f e n d  MPS- o r  s i l o - b a s e d  ICBHs. Examples i n c l u d e :  
"Bed of  N a i l s " :  Thousands of  ' - f t  l o n g  s t e e l  r o d s  would b e  d r i v e n  
i n t o  t h e  ground j u s t  n o r t h  of s i l o s  o r  s h e l t e r s .  ICBM R V s  g e n e r a l l y  f o l l o w  a 
n o r t h - t o - s o u t h  t r a j e c t o r y .  S i n c e  R V s  u s e d  t o  a t t a c k  I C B M s  would need  ex t reme  
a c c u r a c y ,  R V s  w i t h  low aerodynamic d r a g  would p robab ly  be u s e d  t o  minimize 
a t m o s p h e r i c  e f f e c t s  on t h e  RV.  These  R V s  a p p r o a c h  t h e i r  t a r g e t s  a t  s h a l l o w  
a n g l e s ,  s o  would impa le  t h e m s e l v e s  on  t h e  r o d s .  4 1 1  
41 / G a m i n ,  R i c h a r d .  E f f e c t i v e  M i l i t a r y  Technology f o r  t h e  1980s .  
~ n t e r z t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y ,  F a l l  1976 : 53-54. 
"Pebble-Curtain Defense" o r  "Porcupine": P e l l e t s  o r  d a r t s  would be 
p laced  over  a  bed of chemical  e x p l o s i v e s  j u s t  n o r t h  of an  ICBM. A r a d a r  would 
d e t e c t  a n  RV headed f o r  t h e  s i l o  and t r i g g e r  a n  e x p l o s i v e ,  l aunch ing  t h e  
p r o j e c t i l e s  i n t o  t he  R V ' s  path.  421 
"Swarmjet": Very s m a l l ,  cheap ,  f a s t  m i s s i l e s  would be f i r e d  i n  s a l v o s  
f o r  low a l t i t u d e  de fense ,  d e s t r o y i n g  RVs by impact.  
Advocates contend t h a t  t h e s e  sys tems c a n  s u c c e s s f u l l y  defend  I C B M s ,  and 
t h a t  t h e i r  s i m p l i c i t y ,  low c o s t ,  low t e c h n i c a l  r i s k ,  and p o s s i b i l i t y  of r a p i d  
deployment make them a t t r a c t i v e .  The B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e  Defense  depu ty  program 
manager b e l i e v e s  they  "a re  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s y n t h e s i z e  and s t i l l  meet t h e  c r i t e r i a  
of low c o s t ,  r a p i d  d e p l o y a b i l i t y  and adequa te  e f f e c t i v e n e s s . "  431 
"Dust Defense": Clean  n u c l e a r  d e v i c e s  would be de tona t ed  on  o r  under 
t h e  ground nea r  I C B M s  t o  send  up c l o u d s  of d u s t  t o  d i s a b l e  a t t a c k i n g  R V s .  There  
i s  no t e c h n i c a l  cha l l enge  t o  t h e  a s s e r t i o n  i t  would be h i g h l y  e f f e c t i v e .  The 
r a d i o a c t i v i t y  of t h e s e  d e v i c e s  cou ld  be h e l d  t o  a  low l e v e l ,  1% of t h a t  f o r  a  
n u c l e a r  weapon of s t anda rd  des ign ,  OTA e s t i m a t e s .  4 4 1  The sys tem cou ld  be -
deployed r a p i d l y  and a t  low c o s t .  The "preemptive f r a t r i c i d e "  would make S o v i e t  
p l anne r s  h igh ly  u n c e r t a i n  of t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  d e s t r o y  I C B M s ,  advoca t e s  a rgue ,  
enhancing d e t e r r e n c e .  
The drawback i s  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  sys tem would be v e r y  ha rd  
t o  o b t a i n .  Two p o t e n t i a l  problems a r e  of minimum concern.  The l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  
4 3 1  Davis ,  Wil l iam, J r .  B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e  Defense I n t o  t h e  E i g h t i e s .  
~ a t i o G l  Defense,  Sept.-Oct. 1979 : 62. 
4 4 1  OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Bas ing ,  p. 127.  -
t h e  d e v i c e s  would d e t o n a t e  w i thou t  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  i s  low, a s  f o r  n u c l e a r  weapons 
i n  g e n e r a l ,  and t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  f a l l o u t  t h e y  would g e n e r a t e  i n  a  n u c l e a r  war 
w i th  thousands of l a r g e  S o v i e t  RVs d e t o n a t i n g  i s  immater ia l .  The r e a l  concern 
i s  t h a t  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  might  d e t o n a t e  hundreds of  t h e s e  d e v i c e s  on f a l s e  warning,  
k i l l i n g  many Americans. For  t h i s  reason ,  c r i t i c s  b e l i e v e ,  no P r e s i d e n t  would 
u s e  i t ,  making i t s  d e t e r r e n t  e f f e c t  low and i t s  deployment u s e l e s s .  
Launch on Warnin& 
I C B M s  cou ld  be launched on  warning of a t t a c k ,  a  concept  termed l aunch  on 
warning,  o r  LOW. A v a r i a n t  i s  launch  under a t t a c k ,  o r  LUA, sometimes de f ined  
a s  launch  upon a t t a i n i n g  h i g h  con f idence  t h a t  a  mass ive  a t t a c k  was underway o r  
a f t e r  R V s  had exploded on U.S. t e r r i t o r y .  T h i s  method p l a c e s  g r e a t  r e l i a n c e  
on a c c u r a t e  warning: e r r o r  would mean n u c l e a r  war by a c c i d e n t  o r  t h e  d e s t r u c -  
t i o n  of our  I C B M s .  For  f e a r  of t h e  f i r s t  e r r o r ,  t h e  U.S. has p r e f e r r e d  t o  have 
i t s  I C B M s  a b l e  t o  r i d e  o u t  a n  a t t a c k  b e f o r e  be ing  launched.  But w i t h  I C B M s  
widely seen a s  becoming v u l n e r a b l e ,  some b e l i e v e  t h a t  we should  p repa re  t o  LOW 
s o  a s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  s i z e  and c o o r d i n a t i o n  of t h e  r e t a l i a t i o n ,  t h u s  maximizing 
t h e  d e t e r r e n t  va lue  of each deployed ICBM. 
U.S. p o l i c y  has  been n e i t h e r  t o  conf i rm n o r  deny t h a t  we would LOW. A t  
i s s u e  now i s  not  whether we s t a t e  LOW t o  be our  p o l i c y ,  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t s  could 
b e l i e v e  we would ( o r  would n o t )  LOW r e g a r d l e s s  of o u r  s t a t e m e n t .  Fo r  LOW t o  
enhance d e t e r r e n c e ,  what counts  i s  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which we can make t h e  S o v i e t s  
b e l i e v e  we would LOW. The c r e d i b i l i t y  of a  s t a t e d  o r  u n s t a t e d  LOW p o l i c y  
depends on a c q u i r i n g  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  LOW. T h i s  i n c l u d e s  hardware,  such  a s  
augmenting s e n s o r s  and communication equipment; p rocedures  f o r  hand l ing  i n f o r -  
mat ion ,  t r a n s m i t t i n g  d e c i s i o n s ,  and pas s ing  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  launch  n u c l e a r  
weapons from one person t o  ano the r  r a p i d l y  a s  c i rcumstances  r e q u i r e ;  and making 
key d e c i s i o n s  w e l l  i n  advance s o  t h e y  can  be implemented r a p i d l y .  Fo r  example: 
Would we launch  I C B M s  i r r e v o c a b l y  armed, unarmed but  armable i n  f l i g h t ,  o r  armed 
but  d i s a rmab le  i n  f l i g h t ?  What p o r t i o n  of  t h e  f o r c e  would we l a u n c h  i n  r e sponse  
t o  what magnitude of a t t a c k ?  A t  what t a r g e t s ?  %/ 
Advocates a rgue  t h a t  LOW h a s n ' t  been looked  a t  s e r i o u s l y ,  b u t  d e s e r v e s  
a t t e n t i o n .  They c la im LOW i s  t h e  only  way t o  s a lvage  s u b s t a n t i a l  m i l i t a r y  
va lue  from t h e  c u r r e n t  I C B M  f o r c e  d u r i n g  t h e  1980s. I t  i s  " a v a i l a b l e  now," DOD 
s t a t e s .  %/ Major advances i n  e l e c t r o n i c s  g i v e  us  h igh  con f idence  t h a t  LOW 
would work p rope r ly ,  advoca t e s  contend .  A s  improvements were  added ,  o u r  con f i -  
dence would i n c r e a s e  f u r t h e r .  Any r i s k s  of LOW must be weighed a g a i n s t  t h e  
(presumed) e r o s i o n  of d e t e r r e n c e  and i n c r e a s e d  r i s k  of  war by hav ing  v u l n e r a b l e  
ICBMs through 1990 o r  so. A d e c i s i o n  t o  use LOW would spu r  improvements needed 
i n  C3 anyway. Like  s p a r e  p a r t s  and maintenance,  C3 h a s  been pas sed  o v e r  i n  
f avo r  of new weapons, ye t  i t  i s  t h e  most c r i t i c a l  a s p e c t  of our  s t r a t e g i c  
f o r c e s :  I t  p r e s e n t s  a  tempting v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  a n  a t t a c k e r  u n l e s s  i t  c a n  
perform i n s t a n t l y  and f l a w l e s s l y  d e s p i t e  a t t e m p t s  t o  d i s r u p t  i t .  T h i s  capa- 
b i l i t y  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  LOW a s  w e l l  a s  t o  C3 i n  g e n e r a l ;  i ndeed ,  some proponents  
of LOW might argue t h a t  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  LOW i s  one minimum t e s t  of adequacy 
of C3. 
45/ See Garwin, Richard .  Launch Under A t t ack  t o  Resolve  Minuteman 
~ u l n e r a b i l i t ~ ?  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y ,  Winter 1979/80: 117-139; and Graham, 
Wil l iam,  e t  a l .  Discussion:  V iab le  U.S. S t r a t e g i c  M i s s i l e  F o r c e s  f o r  t h e  
E a r l y  1980s. I n  Van Cleave,  Wil l iam, and W. S c o t t  Thompson. S t r a t e g i c  
Options f o r  t h e  E a r l y  E i g h t i e s :  What Can Be Done? New York,  N a t i o n a l  S t r a t e g y  
In fo rma t ion  Cen te r ,  I nc . ,  1979. p. 143-146. 
46/ U.S. Department of  Defense.  O f f i c e  of  t h e  Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y  
of ~ e x n s e  f o r  Research and Engineer ing  ( S t r a t e g i c  and Space Systems).  ICBM 
Basing Opt ions :  A Summary of  Major S t u d i e s  To Def ine  a  S u r v i v a b l e  Bas ing  
Concept f o r  ICBMs.  December 1980. p. 16. 
LOW has  s e v e r a l  b e n e f i c i a l  m i l i t a r y  consequences. I t  would provide  a  
d i s i n c e n t i v e  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t s  t o  b u i l d  a n  ABH, f o r  i t  would be f a r  h a r d e r  f o r  a n  
ABM t o  defend a g a i n s t  a  l a r g e ,  wel l -coord ina ted  r e t a l i a t o r y  s t r i k e  coming a l l  
a t  once t h a n  a g a i n s t  a  ragged a t t a c k  from a  s m a l l  s u r v i v i n g  f o r c e .  LOW would 
enhance t h e  v a l u e  of our  bomber f o r c e .  I C B M s  would be used t o  d e s t r o y  S o v i e t  
a i r  d e f e n s e  s i t e s ,  c r e a t i n g  c o r r i d o r s  f o r  bombers; LOW would pe rmi t  more I C B M s  
t o  be used f o r  t h i s  purpose.  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  number of S o v i e t  t a r g e t s  
s t r u c k  by I C B M s  and bombers would pe rmi t  h o l d i n g  more U.S. SLBMs i n  r e s e r v e ,  
i n c r e a s i n g  our  ba rga in ing  l e v e r a g e  f o r  war t e rmina t i on .  A l l  t h i s  i s  ach ieved ,  
a d v o c a t e s  s t a t e ,  by a  sys tem t h a t  i s  t o t a l l y  compat ib le  w i t h  e x i s t i n g  and 
p r o s p e c t i v e  arms c o n t r o l  agreements  and means of v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  s i n c e  no new 
weapon sys tems  a r e  involved .  
LOW i s  cheaper  t h a n  o t h e r  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e  o p t i o n s ;  OTA e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  
t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  C3 and warning improvements needed f o r  LOW would c o s t  s e v e r a l  
b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s .  - 4 7 1  LOW would c r e a t e  no envi ronmenta l  impact  beyond t h a t  
a l r e a d y  c r e a t e d  by I C B M s .  
Some might a rgue  t h a t  LOW would be d e s t a b i l i z i n g  because  t h e  S o v i e t s ,  
s e e i n g  a  1J.S. LOW c a p a b i l i t y  emerge, might f e a r  we would launch  a  f i r s t  s t r i k e  
and p r e p a r e  t o  do s o  themselves .  Yet t h a t  f e a r  i s  ungrounded, advoca t e s  would 
coun te r .  I f  t h e  S o v i e t s  be l i eved  t h a t  we could LOW, they  would r e a l i z e  we had 
no need t o  s t r i k e  f i r s t .  Moreover,  S o v i e t  d i s comfo r t  caused  by LOW shou ld  be  
of no concern  t o  us.  S o v i e t  a c t i o n s  have put  our  I C B M s  i n t o  a  use-or-lose 
s i t u a t i o n .  Why should  we spend t e n s  of b i l l i o n s  t o  remedy a  problem t h e y  have  
c r e a t e d  i n  a way comfor tab le  t o  them? I f  we b e l i e v e  some s t igma a t t a c h e s  t o  
4 7 1  OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Basing:  Summary, p. 30. -
a  U.S. d e c l a r a t i o n  of LOW, we can simply a c q u i r e  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  LOW. The 
S o v i e t s  w i l l  r e a d  t h e  same message whether  o r  n o t  we d e c l a r e  a  LOW p o l i c y .  
C r i t i c s  no t e  t h a t ,  w i th  LOW, ICBMs would have no endurance ( i . e . ,  t he  
a b i l i t y  f o r  m i s s i l e s  t h a t  s u r v i v e  a t t a c k  t o  o p e r a t e  f o r  l o n g  p e r i o d s ) .  
Proponents  respond t h a t  endurance i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n  w i t h  any f i x e d - s i t e  
ICBM.  MPS p rov ides  endurance o n l y  i f  t h e  S o v i e t s  do n o t  have  enough R V s  o f  
s u f f i c i e n t  r e l i a b i l i t y  and c a p a b i l i t y  t o  d e s t r o y  a l l  t h e  s h e l t e r s ,  i n  which 
c a s e  t hey  would probably  n o t  a t t a c k .  An ABM d e f e n s e  of  s i l o s  o r  MPS r e l i a b l y  
i n c r e a s e s  endurance by a t  most a  few minutes ,  f o r  once t h e  ABMs have been 
exhaus ted  o r  des t royed ,  t h e  n e x t  wave of  R V s  cou ld  d e s t r o y  t h e  ICBMs .  C leve r  
t a c t i c s  might permit  e a r l i e r  d e s t r u c t i o n  of defended I C B M s .  I t  i s  p o i n t l e s s  
t o  spend b i l l i o n s  on a l t e r n a t i v e  b a s i n g  modes, ABM, e t c . ,  t o  g a i n  a  few 
minutes of d e c i s i o n  t ime,  proponents  b e l i e v e ;  we should  s imply  r ecogn ize  t h a t  
technology has  made f i x e d - s i t e  I C B M s  unab le  t o  endure ,  and a d o p t  LOW. 
Opponents of LOW respond t h a t  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  w i th  a l l  i t s  r e s o u r c e s ,  
s h o u l d n ' t  have t o  r e l y  on a  sys tem t h a t  p l a c e s  a  h a i r  t r i g g e r  on n u c l e a r  war. 
They doubt we could have conf idence  t h a t  t h e  e n t i r e  system -- s e n s o r s ,  communi- 
c a t i o n s ,  p rocedures ,  and peop le  -- would work r i g h t  i n s t a n t l y .  The P r e s i d e n t  
might l a c k  in fo rma t ion  needed t o  LOW, such a s  which t a r g e t s  t h e  S o v i e t s  chose 
n o t  t o  a t t a c k ,  s o  might be unab le  t o  de t e rmine  which t a r g e t s  t o  s t r i k e  i n  
r e t a l i a t i o n  be fo re  t h e  a t t a c k i n g  R V s  a r r i v e .  I f  we depend on LOW, DOD s t a t e s ,  
" t h e  S o v i e t s  would s u r e l y  d e v i s e  ways t o  b l i n d  o u r  warning sys tems i n  a  pre-  
c u r s o r  a t t a c k ,  t he reby  i n h i b i t i n g  our  a b i l i t y  and w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  launch  a  
r e t a l i a t o r y  a t t a c k  w i t h  o n l y  i n c o n c l u s i v e  ev idence ."  481 The sys tem needed 
481 Department of  Defense ,  I C B M  Bas ing  Op t ions ,  p. 17. -
f o r  high-confidence LOW -- t h e  only  k ind  we should contemplate  -- would t a k e  
t ime t o  deploy;  OTA e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  a lmos t  a l l  t h e  needed improvements cou ld  be  
deployed by t h e  end of t h e  decade. 491 D e s p i t e  deploying  t h i s  system, OTA 
n o t e s ,  we cou ld  neve r  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  " l i n g e r i n g  f e a r "  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  cou ld  
d e f e a t  t h e  LOW system o r  t h a t  t h e  system could f a i l  c a t a s t r o p h i c a l l y .  501 
Opponents f e a r  t h a t  some may s e e  LOW a s  a  panacea and t h i n k  we need do  
no th ing  e l s e .  I n  r e a l i t y ,  opponents  a s s e r t ,  we must f a c e  up t o  t h e  need t o  
spend b i l l i o n s  on  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s  t h a t  c a n  s u r v i v e  and endure .  With LOW, o u r  
I C B M s  would be launched o r  des t royed  a t  t h e  s t a r t  of a  war, e l i m i n a t i n g  our  
most c o n t r o l l a b l e  and f a s t e s t - r e a c t i n g  weapons, and s e v e r e l y  i n h i b i t i n g  o u r  
a b i l i t y  t o  f i g h t  a  war o r  n e g o t i a t e  war t e rmina t ion .  By launching  many ICBMs 
a t  t h e  s t a r t  o f  war,  we would a c c e p t  t h e  r i s k  of e s c a l a t i n g  t h e  war beyond 
what we would p r e f e r .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  we would weaken our  a b i l i t y  t o  c o n t r o l  
e s c a l a t i o n  and p rov ide  " i n t r a w a r  d e t e r r e n c e "  -- t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  d e t e r  t h e  
S o v i e t s  from s t r i k i n g  c e r t a i n  t a r g e t s  du r ing  a  war, i n  t h i s  c a s e  by t h r e a t  
of p r e c i s e  r e t a l i a t i o n .  I n  sum, c r i t i c s  b e l i e v e ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  should  neve r  
have t o  make t h e  most momentous d e c i s i o n  p o s s i b l e  under t h e  extreme p r e s s u r e  
t h a t  LOW e n t a i l s ;  we should  buy s u r v i v a b l e  and endur ing  f o r c e s  i n s t e a d .  
Perhaps  t he  wors t  problem wi th  LOW, c r i t i c s  a rgue ,  i s  t h a t  i t  would 
t h r e a t e n  u s .  R e a l i z i n g  t h a t  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  was a t t a i n i n g  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  
LOW, and r ecogn iz ing  t h a t  f a l s e  warning could r e s u l t  i n  a  U.S. a t t a c k  t h a t  
could  d e s t r o y  most S o v i e t  I C B M s ,  t h e  S o v i e t s  would f e e l  compelled t o  adop t  
a  LOW p o l i c y .  With both s i d e s  having a c c u r a t e  I C B M s  ready  t o  launch  on a  
moment's n o t i c e ,  t h e  r i s k  of n u c l e a r  war would i n c r e a s e .  
491  OTA, M X  M i s s i l e  Basing:  Summary, p. 30.  -
5 0 /  I b i d . ,  p. 31. -
NON-LAND BASING FOR MX 
O the r s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  must respond t o  t h e  t h r e a t  posed by 
S o v i e t  I C B M s ,  view LOW a s  i nadequa te ,  and f i n d  t h a t  each  l and  bas ing  mode f o r  
MX proposed s o  f a r  h a s  f a t a l  d e f e c t s .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e y  con tend ,  we have  no 
cho ice  but  t o  g i v e  up on deploying  new land-based I C B M s .  To r e t a i n  some d e s i r -  
a b l e  f e a t u r e s  of  t h e  t r i a d ,  t h e y  b e l i e v e ,  we shou ld  dep loy  MX on  a i r c r a f t  o r  on 
sma l l  submarines.  
Ai rmobi le  
P r e s s  r e p o r t s  of August 1981 i n d i c a t e d  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was c o n s i d e r i n g  
a i r m o b i l e  MX (AMMX). 511 Under t h i s  concept ,  I C B M s  would be dropped from l a r g e  
a i r c r a f t  by pa rachu te ,  t h e n  f i r e d .  The A i r  Fo rce  demonst ra ted  t h e  concep t ' s  
f e a s i b i l i t y  i n  1974 by launching  a  Hinuteman from a  C-5 l a r g e  t r a n s p o r t  a i r c r a f t  
and comple t ing  a  19-second t e s t  f i r i n g .  521 
The r e p o r t e d  p l an  env i s ioned  modifying perhaps 115 C-5s t o  c a r r y  one MX 
a p i e c e  i n  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  100 a i r c r a f t  on a l e r t  a t  any  t ime.  =/ S i n c e  t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  now has 77 C-5s, t h e  p roduc t ion  l i n e ,  c l o s e d  i n  1973, would have 
t o  be  reopened.  Lockheed, which b u i l t  t h e  C-5, h a s  r e p o r t e d l y  submi t t ed  a  b r i e f  
p roposa l  f o r  s o  doing. 541 The f i r s t  a i r c r a f t  might be o p e r a t i o n a l  a s  e a r l y  a s  
1986. 
511  See ,  f o r  example, Cannon, Lou. Reagan t o  Recommend a n  Air-Launched - 
MX. Washington P o s t ,  Aug. 1, 1981: A l .  
521 Drop of Minuteman by C-5A T e s t s  Air-Mobile I C B M  Concept.  A v i a t i o n  
Week and  Space Technology, Nov. 11, 1974 : 21. 
53 /  Robinson, C la rence ,  J r .  Weinberger Pushes  S t r a t e g i c  Airmobi le  MX 
concept .  A v i a t i o n  Week and Space Technology, Aug. 3 ,  1981 : 17.  
541 I b i d .  -
While dep loy ing  MX on C-5s, DOD would a l s o  deve lop ,  and perhaps  deploy  i n  
FY88, a  f l e e t  o f  a i r c r a f t  de s igned  t o  c a r r y  MX a s  a  f  ollow-on t o  t h e  C-5s. The 
a i r c r a f t ,  "Big B i r d , "  would l ook  l i k e  a  huge g l i d e r ,  w i th  a  wingspan of 360 f t  
and a  f u s e l a g e  164 f t  long .  It would have  f o u r  24- f t  p r o p e l l e r s .  551 (By 
comparison,  t h e  C-5 is  247 f t  l ong ,  has  a  222-ft  wingspan, and has  f o u r  j e t  
e n g i n e s . )  Big B i r d  would c r u i s e  a t  5000 f t  a t  100 k n o t s  (115  mph). I t  c o u l d  
remain a i r b o r n e  f o r  n e a r l y  7  days  un re fue l ed .  
SLBMs pose  t h e  g r e a t e s t  t h r e a t  t o  a i r m o b i l e  I C B M s .  SLBM f l i g h t  t i m e s  
could  be a s  s h o r t  a s  7  minutes ,  561 and c u r r e n t  (modest) S o v i e t  SLBM accu racy  
s u f f i c e s  t o  b a r r a g e  a i r b a s e s .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  a i r m o b i l e  sys tem would r e q u i r e  
enhanc ing  t h e  s e n s o r s ,  communication sys tems ,  e t c . ,  t o  warn of SLBM a t t a c k ,  and 
having  t h e  a i r c r a f t  t a k e  o f f  immedia te ly  on warning.  Hardening t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  
r e s i s t  n u c l e a r  weapon e f f e c t s  would a l s o  reduce  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  SLBM 
t h r e a t .  571 -
The a i r c r a f t  cou ld  be based  i n  s e v e r a l  ways. They cou ld  be d i s p e r s e d  
a t  a u s t e r e  ba se s  i n  n o r t h  c e n t r a l  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and main ta ined  on ground a l e r t ,  
ready  t o  t a k e  o f f  on warning.  T h i s  deployment might  be v u l n e r a b l e  t o  SLBM 
a t t a c k .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h e  a i r c r a f t  could  be moved t o  c o a s t a l  b a s e s  and kep t  
on a i r b o r n e  a l e r t  ove r  t h e  oceans  d u r i n g  c r i s e s .  T h i s  app roach ,  however, i s  
ex t r eme ly  c o s t l y  i f  C-5s a r e  used and s t r e s s e s  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  DOD n o t e s  t h a t  
t h e s e  two approaches  might be combined, u s i n g  ground a l e r t  u s u a l l y  and a i r  
551 I b i d .  -
561 P e r r y ,  Wi l l iam (Under S e c r e t a r y  of Defense f o r  Research  and Engineer -  -
i n g ) .  Testimony. I n  U.S. Sena t e .  Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s .  F i s c a l  Year 
1979 Supplementa l  M i l i t a r y  A u t h o r i z a t i o n .  Hear ings .  p. 103.  
571  OTA, NX M i s s i l e  Bas ing ,  p. 228.  -
a l e r t  i n  c r i s i s  o r  i f  S o v i e t  SSBNs were massed nea r  t h e  c o a s t s .  z/ Big Bi rd  
i s  des igned  t o  b e  s o  f u e l - e f f i c i e n t  t h a t  t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  c o u l d  a f f o r d  t o  keep  
a s u b s t a n t i a l  f r a c t i o n  of t h e  f o r c e  on cont inuous  a i r b o r n e  a l e r t  a t  a l l  t imes.  
The accu racy  o f  a n  a i r - l aunched  I C B M  i s  i n h e r e n t l y  l e s s  t h a n  t h a t  o f  a  
land-launched ICBM because t h e  i n i t i a l  l aunch  p o s i t i o n ,  v e l o c i t y ,  and o r i e n t a -  
t i o n  cannot  be  known a s  p r e c i s e l y .  To compensate, t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  would need 
t o  deploy a network of n a v i g a t i o n  a i d s ,  e i t h e r  ground t r a n s m i t t e r s  (ground 
beacon sys tem,  GBS) o r  n a v i g a t i o n  s a t e l l i t e s  (Navs t a r ) .  
OTA e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  a  ground a l e r t  a i r m o b i l e  bas ing  f o r c e  could  be acqu i r ed  
and ope ra t ed  u n t i l  2000 f o r  abou t  t h e  same c o s t  a s  a  2 0 0 - ~ X / 4 6 0 0 - ~ ~ ~  system. 
OTA e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  a  con t inuous ly  a i r b o r n e  f o r c e ,  u s i n g  a  s p e c i a l  l a r g e  turbo- 
prop a i r c r a f t  ( n o t  Big B i r d ) ,  could  c o s t  $91 b i l l i o n  (FY80 $ )  t o  a c q u i r e  and 
o p e r a t e  f o r  10 y e a r s  a f t e r  f u l l  deployment. =/ The A i r  Fo rce  has  n o t  y e t  
determined f i r m  l i f e - c y c l e  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  Big B i rd .  =/ 
Advocates  po in t  ou t  many advantages  of  AMMX. I t  avo ids  t h e  s o c i a l ,  envi -  
ronmental ,  and p o l i t i c a l  problems o f  MPS. I t  i s  n o t  n e a r l y  a s  s e n s i t i v e  t o  
i n c r e a s e d  numbers of S o v i e t  I C B M s  a s  i s  MPS, and i s  i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  f r a c t i o n a -  
t i o n  o r  i n c r e a s e d  accu racy  of  t h o s e  m i s s i l e s .  I t  c a n  endure  f o r  h o u r s ,  o r  days  
i n  t h e  c a s e  of Big B i rd ,  whereas MPS might be overwhelmed i f  t h e  S o v i e t s  bu i l t  
enough R V s  o r  l e a r n e d  which s h e l t e r s  con ta ined  m i s s i l e s .  The b a s i n g  mode en- 
t a i l s  no r e a l  t e c h n i c a l  r i s k ,  s i n c e  C-5s have been b u i l t  and a i r  l aunch  of  I C B M s  
has  been demonstrated.  SLBM warning c a p a b i l i t y  would have  t o  be  b u i l t  up ,  b u t  
w i th  good warning and immediate t a k e o f f ,  about  90% o r  more of t h e  f o r c e  could  
581  Department of  Defense ,  I C B M  Basing Op t ions ,  p. 35.  -
591 OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Bas ing ,  p. 220, 230-231. -
59a/  U.S. A i r  Force .  Off i c e  of  t h e  S p e c i a l  A s s i s t a n t  f o r  MX M a t t e r s .  -
Telephone conve r sa t ion ,  October  2 ,  1981. 
s u r v i v e  excep t  i n  one c a s e ,  OTA f i n d s .  - 60/  The system poses no d i f f i c u l t i e s  
f o r  arms c o n t r o l ,  s i n c e  a i r - t o - s u r f a c e  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  a r e  p e r m i t t e d  by 
SALT I1 under  t h e  same r e l e v a n t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  a s  ICBMs.  AMMX would p rov ide  sur-  
v i v i n g  R V s  f o r  e ach  u n i t  dep loyed ,  and c o u l d  do s o  b e f o r e  o t h e r  b a s i n g  modes. 
The added expense  of b u i l d i n g  a  f l e e t  of C-5s b e f o r e  Big B i rd  t o  provide  t h i s  
e a r l y  c a p a b i l i t y  would n o t  be  was ted  because  t h e  C-5s c o u l d  be  u sed  f o r  a i r l i f t  
when Big B i rd  e n t e r s  t h e  i nven to ry .  
Advocates  contend  t h a t  Big B i r d  would o f f s e t  two key  conce rns  of AMMX 
us ing  C-5. I t  would be 5  t o  10 t imes  more f u e l - e f f i c i e n t  t h a n  C-5, %/ s o  
perhaps  h a l f  t h e  a i r c r a f t  cou ld  remain a l o f t  a t  a l l  t i m e s  and s t i l l  r e t a i n  a  
moderate  l i f e - c y c l e  c o s t .  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  i t  would be f a r  more s u r v i v a b l e  t h a n  a  
C-5/MX f l e e t  on s t r i p  a l e r t  and would n o t  r e l y  on warning f o r  s u r v i v a b i l i t y .  
C r i t i c s  l i s t  t h e  fo l l owing  f l aws  w i t h  AMMX. I t  ends t he  s t r a t e g i c  t r i a d  
because i t  h a s  a  key f a i l u r e  mode i n  common w i t h  bombers. The S o v i e t s  cou ld  
use  SLBMs t o  d e s t r o y  both s imu l t aneous ly .  Res t i ng  t h e  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  of two 
t r i a d  e l emen t s  on adequa t e  warning i s  t o o  much of a  r i s k .  Moreover,  t h e  
warning system must be one t h a t  t he  S o v i e t s  could no t  spoo f ,  f o r  i f  they  could 
make u s  send  ou r  bombers and APlMX a l o f t ,  t h e s e  a i r c r a f t  would be  q u i t e  vu lne r -  
a b l e  when they  landed.  AMMX would a l s o  g i v e  t h e  S o v i e t s  an i n c e n t i v e  t o  b u i l d  
many a d d i t i o n a l  I C B M s  t o  b a r r a g e  t h e  a r e a  where bombers and AMMX would be  
a f t e r  t a k e o f f .  
601 OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Bas ing ,  p. 225-228. The e x c e p t i o n  i s  t h a t ,  i f  t h e  
s o v i e t s  a t t a c k e d  a i r f i e l d s  a t  which a i r m o b i l e  I C B M s  were based u s i n g  submarine- 
launched  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  launched  on f a s t  t r a j e c t o r i e s  from submarines a t  
t h e  c o a s t s ,  they  could  under  c e r t a i n  c i rcumstances  d e s t r o y  about  114 t o  112 of 
t h e  a i r c r a f t .  I b i d . ,  p. 2 2 7 .  
611 P incus ,  Wa l t e r .  '2  L i t t l e  Guys' With a  Big  I d e a .  Washington P o s t ,  - 
Aug. 13 ,  1981: A10. 
AMMX endurance would be l i m i t e d  even i f  t h e  a i r c r a f t  escaped  SLBM a t t a c k  
and I C B M  ba r r age .  C-5 could  s t a y  a l o f t  f o r  7-8 hou r s  u n r e f u e l e d ;  Big B i r d  f o r  
days. The S o v i e t s  could  f o r c e  u s  t o  u se  o r  l o s e  o u r  AMMX by d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  few 
hundred a i r f i e l d s  a b l e  t o  r ecove r  C-5s. T h i s  problem c o u l d  n o t  be remedied by 
b u i l d i n g  more a u s t e r e  a i r f i e l d s  t h a n  t h e  S o v i e t s  had ICBM R V s .  A s  OTA n o t e s ,  
"4,600 a i r f i e l d s  spaced 25 m i l e s  a p a r t  would f i l l  t h e  e n t i r e  3 m i l l i o n  s q u a r e  
mi l e s  of t h e  c o n t i n e n t a l  United S t a t e s . "  E/ Moreover, i f  AMMX would p a t r o l  
ove r  t h e  oceans ,  might t h e  S o v i e t s  l o c a t e  them w i t h  r a d a r  o r  i n f r a r e d  s a t e l -  
l i t e s  and d e s t r o y  them wi th  an ICBM ba r r age?  T h i s  would be more of a  problem 
w i t h  Big B i rd  t h a n  C-5. Big B i r d ' s  s lower  speed  p e r m i t s  i t  t o  c o v e r  l e s s  
d i s t a n c e  t han  a  C-5 fo l lowing  ICBM launch ,  s o  t h e  S o v i e t s  could  a t t a c k  i t  wi th  
fewer m i s s i l e s .  
AMMX would be somewhat l e s s  u s a b l e  t h a n  land-launched MX i n  c o u n t e r f o r c e  
a t t a c k s .  I t  could not  respond a s  r a p i d l y  t o  a  launch  command because t h e  
a i r c r a f t  would have t o  t a k e  o f f  b e f o r e  t h e  m i s s i l e  c o u l d  be f i r e d .  I t  would 
be very  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  an a t t a c k  p l a c i n g  R V s  on t a r g e t s  thousands  of 
m i l e s  away on schedu le s  f o r  which t h e  margin of e r r o r  i s  measured i n  seconds  
o r  l e s s ,  s i n c e  t h e  a i r c r a f t  would be a t  widely d i s p e r s e d  and r a p i d l y  s h i f t i n g  
l o c a t i o n s .  
AMMX would r a i s e  s e v e r a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  conce rns ,  c r i t i c s  contend .  I t  
might r a i s e  t h e  r i s k  of war. The S o v i e t s  would have t o  p repa re  i n  advance t o  
preempt o r  l aunch  on warning because ,  upon s e e i n g  t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  send  AMMX 
a l o f t ,  t hey  would not  know i f  we d i d  s o  f o r  t r a i n i n g ,  f o r  f e a r  of a  S o v i e t  
a t t a c k ,  o r  f o r  l aunch ing  a  f i r s t  s t r i k e .  Canada and Mexico might  f e a r  t h a t  t h e  
S o v i e t s  would d e s t r o y  any a i r f i e l d s  t hey  had t h a t  could  r ecove r  AMMX, though 
- --- 
6 2 /  OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Basing:  Summary, p. 38. -
t h e  same concern would a r i s e  r ega rd ing  bombers and t anke r s .  West Germany and 
o t h e r  West European n a t i o n s  have  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i t  would be n e a r l y  imposs ib l e  
p o l i t i c a l l y  t o  permit  U.S. t h e a t e r  n u c l e a r  weapons (Pe r sh ing  I1 and ground- 
launched c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s )  on t h e i r  s o i l  i f  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  does  n o t  base  MX 
on l and ,  f o r  they  would then  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  was no t  w i l l i n g  t o  
run  t h e  r i s k s  of having  n u c l e a r  weapons on i t s  t e r r i t o r y  t h a t  i t  was a s k i n g  t h e  
Europeans t o  run. 631 
T h i s  l a s t  p o i n t  i s  i r o n i c ,  AMMX c r i t i c s  p o i n t  o u t ,  because a  S o v i e t  a t t a c k  
on AMMX would k i l l  many more Americans t han  an a t t a c k  on MPS, 11.3 m i l l i o n  vs. 
5.9 m i l l i o n  i n  a  f i r s t  exchange and 67 t o  93 m i l l i o n  vs .  6.1 m i l l i o n  i n  a  second 
exchange, accord ing  t o  one Department of Defense (DOD)  s tudy .  641 
AMMX i s  complex and d i f f i c u l t  t o  ma in t a in ,  c r i t i c s  no t e .  The r epea t ed  
shocks of a i r  t u rbu lence  and l and ings  w i l l  n e c e s s i t a t e  f r equen t  maintenance f o r  
a i r c r a f t  and m i s s i l e s .  Yet m i s s i l e s  i n  a i r c r a f t  a r e  h a r d e r  t o  a c c e s s  and 
ma in t a in  t han  m i s s i l e s  i n  s i l o s  o r  s h e l t e r s .  Moreover, a  complex l o g i s t i c s  
system i s  needed t o  provide  s p a r e  p a r t s  and maintenance f o r  m i s s i l e s  and a i r -  
c r a f t  a t  many d i s p e r s e d  bases.  E/ Thus us ing  two s o p h i s t i c a t e d  t echno log ie s ,  
a i r c r a f t  and m i s s i l e s ,  i n s t e a d  of one i n c r e a s e s  t h e  r i s k  of  f a i l u r e .  
The system e n t a i l s  many hidden c o s t s .  Navstar  o r  a  ground beacon system 
w i l l  be needed f o r  accuracy .  SLBM warning w i l l  have t o  be  upgraded. Ope ra t ing  
c o s t s  w i l l  be h igh ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  a i r b o r n e  a l e r t  
63 /  Geddes, John .  West Germans See a  Tiny 
 iss six P lans .  Wall S t r e e t  J o u r n a l ,  June  17,  198 
and e s p e c i a l l y  i f  f u e l  p r i c e s  
Utah Town a s  Barometer of  U.S. 
: 32; and Schmidt Warns Reagan 
on MX S i t i n g .  Washington P o s t ,  J u n e  21, 1981: A26. 
64 / Cannon, Lou. Reagan To Recommend an Air-Launched MX. Washington -
P o s t ,  Aug. 1 ,  1981: A l .  
651 Gregory, William. Magic E l i x i r  f o r  MX. A v i a t i o n  Week and Space 
~ e c h n x o ~ ~ ,  J u l y  27,  1981: 11. 
i n c r e a s e .  AMMX w i l l  r e q u i r e  c o s t l y  and complex C3 and l o g i s t i c s .  The Air Force 
b e l i e v e s  291 C-5s would be  needed t o  keep  100 on s t r i p  a l e r t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  
115 t h a t  D O D ' s  O f f i c e  of Program Ana lys i s  and E v a l u a t i o n  e s t i m a t e s .  661 A new 
f l e e t  of  t a n k e r  a i r c r a f t  would presumably be  needed. F i n a l l y ,  t h e y  a s k ,  would 
a  commitment t o  C-5, Big Bi rd ,  B-1, and perhaps a  S t e a l t h  bomber i n c r e a s e  t h e  
c o s t s  of  o t h e r  m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  a i r c r a f t ?  Indeed ,  do  we have  t h e  produc- 
t i o n  c a p a c i t y  t o  b u i l d  a l l  t h o s e  a i r c r a f t  i n  a  s h o r t  t ime?  
Because o f  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  AMMX h a s  a t t r a c t e d  powerfu l  opponents .  A 
DOD s tudy  of December 1980, "ICBM Basing Opt ions ,  " found no major  p o s i t i v e  
f e a t u r e s  f o r  wide-bodied j e t  b a s i n g  of  MX. 671 Three  A i r  F o r c e  g e n e r a l s  r e p o r t -  
e d l y  would r e s i g n  i f  AMMX were chosen. Some members of t h e  Townes Committee 
r e p o r t e d l y  opposed AMMX. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  P r i c e  and Dickinson  w r o t e  t o  S e c r e t a r y  
Weinberger vo i c ing  t h e i r  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  AMMX. Sena to r  Tower, i n  a  p r e s s  con- 
f e r e n c e  o f  August 1, s a i d :  "The a i r  mobi le  p l a n  h a s  been c a r e f u l l y  s t u d i e d  and 
v i r t u a l l y  d i s ca rded  by t h e  House and Sena te  [Armed S e r v i c e s  Committees] a s  t o o  
u n r e l i a b l e ,  t o o  c o s t l y ,  and of q u e s t i o n a b l e  s u r v i v a b i l i t y . "  A s  a  r e s u l t ,  h e  
i n d i c a t e d ,  Congress  might r e j e c t  t h e  proposa l .  681 
Smal l  Submarine Basing 
T h i s  concept  e n v i s i o n s  u s i n g  s m a l l  submarines t o  c a r r y  two o r  f o u r  MX ( o r  
o t h e r )  m i s s i l e s  h o r i z o n t a l l y  i n  c a n i s t e r s  o u t s i d e  t h e  p r e s s u r e  h u l l .  Perhaps  
6 6 1  USAF A n a l y s i s  A t t a c k s  Airmobi le  MX Concept.  A v i a t i o n  Week and Space 
~ e c h n x o ~ ~ ,  Aug. 17 ,  1981 : 30-31; and Robinson, C la rence ,  Jr .  Weinberger 
Pushes S t r a t e g i c  Airmobi le  MX Concept.  A v i a t i o n  Week and Space Technology,  
Aug. 3 ,  1981: 17. 
67/  Department o f  Defense ,  I C B M  Bas ing  Op t ions ,  p. 34.  -
68/  Regarding c r i t i c i s m  of a i r m o b i l e  M X ,  s e e  f o o t n o t e  4 on p. 3; and 
~ o w e r z o h n .  S ta tement  on t h e  MX M i s s i l e ,  Aug. 1 ,  1981. p. 1. 
51-72 b o a t s  would be deployed,  w i t h  28-55 on s t a t i o n  a t  any time. 691 A f l e e t  -
o p e r a t i n g  from two b a s e s ,  one e a c h  on t h e  e a s t  and wes t  c o a s t s ,  w i t h  a  p a t r o l  
r a d i u s  of 1000 mi and us ing  a  6500-nmi range  m i s s i l e ,  would have a  p a t r o l  a r e a  
of 2  m i l l i o n  sq  nmi. 701 The m i s s i l e s  cou ld  probably  meet t h e  accu racy  r e q u i r e -  
ments of land-launched MX by u s i n g  s t e l l a r  i n e r t i a l  guidance. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
Navs t a r  s a t e l l i t e s  o r  a  ground ( r a d i o )  beacon system (GBS) could  have  t h e  same 
r e s u l t .  711 Varying des igns  have been s e t  f o r t h ,  i n c l u d i n g  ones by DOD and OTA, 
and "smal l sub  unde r sea  mobi le , "  o r  SUM, by Sidney D r e l l  and Richard  Garwin. 
P r e s s u r e  h u l l  d i sp lacement  would be 1100-3300 t o n s ,  vs .  18,700 f o r  T r i d e n t ;  
crew s i z e  would be  15-45, vs .  133 f o r  T r i d e n t ;  s m a l l  submarines cou ld  o p e r a t e  
500-1500 nmi from t h e  U.S. c o a s t  vs .  thousands f o r  T r i d e n t ,  bu t  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  
r ea son  t o  b e l i e v e  t h e y  cou ld  n o t  o p e r a t e  2000 t o  3000 nmi from t h e i r  b a s e s  i f  i t  
were neces sa ry  t o  do so. I n i t i a l  o p e r a t i o n a l  c a p a b i l i t y  (IOC), when t h e  f i r s t  
u n i t s  would be o p e r a t i o n a l ,  i s  v a r i o u s l y  e s t i m a t e d  a s  1988-1992, w i t h  f u l l  
o p e r a t i o n a l  c a p a b i l i t y  (FOC), when a l l  u n i t s  would be o p e r a t i o n a l ,  about  f o u r  
y e a r s  l a t e r .  
A small submarine sys tem cou ld  h o l d  c o s t s  down i n  s e v e r a l  ways. Smal l  sub- 
marines would not  need n u c l e a r  t u r b i n e  p ropu l s ion ,  but  could u se  d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c  
p ropu l s ion .  Communication would r e q u i r e  lower power t r a n s m i t t e r s  t h a n  a r e  used 
f o r  Poseidon.  The submarines would use  e x t e n s i v e  automation t o  minimize crew 
691 OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Basing: Summary, p. 33; and 
mony on bas ing  t h e  MX a t  s e a  on s m a l l  submarines: t h e  
Defense and M i l i t a r y  C o n s t r u c t i o n  Subcommittees of t h e  
Committee, June  19 ,  1981. p. 11, 20. 
701 Telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  OTA s t a f f ,  Sep t .  2 3 ,  -
D r e l l ,  Sidney.  T e s t i -  
SUM system, be fo re  
S e n a t e  Appropr i a t i ons  
711 OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Bas ing ,  p. 202-208. See a l s o  System Planning  Corp. 
An ~ s s e s s n e n t  o f  Small  Submarines and Encapsu la t i on  of  B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e s  -- 
Phase 1 .  U n c l a s s i f i e d  Vers ion ,  Execu t ive  Summary. May 1980. Prepared  f o r  
Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y  of  Defense f o r  Research  and Engineer ing  ( S t r a t e g i c  and 
Space Systems).  p. 7. 
s i z e .  For  i t s  a n a l y s i s ,  OTA p o s t u l a t e s  a  f l e e t  o f  51 submar ines ,  wi th  28 a t  
s e a  a t  a l l  t i m e s ,  o p e r a t i n g  from t h r e e  bases .  Each would d i s p l a c e  3,300 t o n s  
( p r e s s u r e  h u l l  on ly )  and c a r r y  f o u r  MX m i s s i l e s .  T h i s  f l e e t ,  OTA e s t i m a t e s ,  
would c o s t  $32 b i l l i o n  (FY80 $ )  f o r  a c q u i s i t i o n  and $7 b i l l i o n  f o r  o p e r a t i o n  
u n t i l  2000; s i n c e  no d e t a i l e d  d e s i g n  e x i s t s ,  t h e s e  c o s t s  a r e  approximate.  721 
Advocates c l a im  t h a t  t h i s  f l e e t  would be  v e r y  s u r v i v a b l e  a g a i n s t  any  known 
o r  f o r e s e e a b l e  an t i submar ine  war fa re  (ASW) t h r e a t .  731 I ts  o p e r a t i o n  r e l a t i v e l y  
n e a r  t h e  c o a s t s  hampers a c o u s t i c  ASW, t h e  most w ide ly  used  form, and would 
f a c i l i t a t e  Navy p ro t ec t ion .  The Uni ted  S t a t e s  could  compl i ca t e  a c o u s t i c  ASW by 
p l a c i n g  decoys and a c o u s t i c  g e n e r a t o r s  i n  deployment zones.  D i e s e l - e l e c t r i c  
p ropu l s ion  i s  q u i e t e r  t han  nuc l ea r .  I t  would be d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e s t r o y  t h e  e n t i r e  
f l e e t  s imu l t aneous ly  w i t h  s t a n d a r d  ASW methods because  many submar ines  would be  
deployed,  and t h e  deployment a r e a  would be t o o  l a r g e  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t s  t o  ba r r age  
w i t h  n u c l e a r  weapons. Radar d e t e c t i o n  w h i l e  s n o r k e l i n g  cou ld  be r ende red  a  
"very l i m i t e d "  problem, a  DOD s t u d y  f i n d s .  741 I f  a  r a d a r  t h r e a t  deve lops ,  t h e  
United S t a t e s  cou ld  c o n v e r t  submar ines  t o  f u e l  c e l l  p r o p u l s i o n  d u r i n g  o v e r h a u l s  
o r  could  use  n u c l e a r - e l e c t r i c  propuls ion .  
The d i f f i c u l t y  of  d e s t r o y i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  submarines h a s  many consequences.  
Each one deployed c o n t r i b u t e s  s u r v i v i n g  m i s s i l e s  wh i l e  MPS e n a b l e s  few m i s s i l e s  
t o  s u r v i v e  u n t i l  most s h e l t e r s  a r e  deployed ,  s o ,  s u p p o r t e r s  a r g u e ,  i t  i s  u n f a i r  
t o  compare t h e  I O C  of t h i s  system w i t h  t h a t  of MPS. The number of s u r v i v o r s  
i s  i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  numbers of S o v i e t  R V s ,  s o  t h e  sys tem g i v e s  t h e  S o v i e t s  no  
721 OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Basing:  Summary, p. 32-36. -
731 See D r e l l ,  Testimony on bas ing  t h e  MX a t  s e a  on s m a l l  submar ines ,  f o r  
t h e  c a s e  f o r  t h i s  b a s i n g  mode. 
741 System P lann ing  Corp.,  An Assessment of Smal l  Submarines and Encap- 
s u l a t z n  of B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e s  -- Phase 1, U n c l a s s i f i e d  Vers ion ,  Execu t ive  
Summary, p.  11. 
i n c e n t i v e  t o  add RVs.  The program cou ld  be completed w i th  a  known number of 
submar ines ,  making i t s  c o s t  and s c h e d u l e  more p r e d i c t a b l e .  With MPS, i n  
c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  S o v i e t s  could  add RVs, f o r c i n g  u s  t o  add s h e l t e r s ,  d e l a y i n g  
s u r v i v a b i l i t y ,  and d r i v i n g  up c o s t s .  
T h i s  sys tem i s  h i g h l y  compa t ib l e  w i t h  arms c o n t r o l ,  p roponen t s  a s s e r t .  
P rocedu re s  f o r  mon i to r ing  numbers of submarines a r e  w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d .  It 
p l a c e s  no premium on launch-on-warning, t h u s  r educ ing  t h e  r i s k  of  a c c i d e n t a l  
war. I t  a v o i d s  t h e  need f o r  a n  ARM, t h u s  h e l p i n g  p r e s e r v e  t h e  ABM Trea ty .  
Smal l  submar ines  c o u l d  u s e  e x i s t i n g  technology  and o p e r a t i o n a l  pro- 
cedu re s ;  OTA f i n d s  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  r i s k s  of i t s  proposed d e s i g n  t o  be low. =/ 
I t  would have  minimal  s o c i e t a l  and envi ronmenta l  impac t ,  s i n c e  i t  would u s e  
on ly  a  few c o a s t a l  bases .  By moving s t r a t e g i c  weapons from l a n d ,  sma l l  
submar ines  r educe  t h e  f a l l o u t  l i k e l y  from a  n u c l e a r  war. 
Advocates  r e j e c t  cha rges  t h a t  u s i n g  sma l l  submarines i n s t e a d  of land- 
based MX would move t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  t o  a  s t r a t e g i c  dyad. The e s s e n c e  of 
t h e  t r i a d ,  t hey  a rgue ,  i s  t h a t  t h r e e  independent  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s  o b s t r u c t  
a  f i r s t  s t r i k e :  They a r e  h a r d e r  t o  a t t a c k  o r  defend  a g a i n s t ;  t h e  weapons a r e  
s u i t e d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  m i s s ions ;  t h e  t r i a d  p rov ides  t ime  i n  which t o  remedy 
weakness i n  one o r  two of i t s  e l emen t s ;  e t c .  T h i s  sys tem accompl i shes  t h e s e  
g o a l s ,  i t s  s u p p o r t e r s  contend.  S ince  i t s  s i z e ,  numbers, deployment a r e a ,  
o b s e r v a b l e  f e a t u r e s ,  and o p e r a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  would d i f f e r  from t h o s e  
of T r i d e n t ,  i t  poses a  d i f f e r e n t  ASW problem. A s  OTA no te s :  "The d i f f e r e n c e s  
between t h e  T r i d e n t  f l e e t  . . . and t h e  [ submar ine]  MX f l e e t  . . . c o u l d  make 
i t  more d i f f i c u l t ,  and perhaps  imposs ib l e ,  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t s  t o  deploy  a n  a n t i -  
submarine w a r f a r e  f o r c e  c a p a b l e  o f  a t t a c k i n g  both ."  761  They would have  t o  
7 5 1  OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Basing:  Summary, p. 3 4 .  - 
c o n c e n t r a t e  t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  i n  what OTA c a l l s  t h e  "very unpromising" a r e a  of 
s t r a t e g i c  ASW. 771' I n  a d d i t i o n ,  l aunch ing  a m i s s i l e  from a  T r i d e n t  submarine 
r e v e a l s  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of 23 o t h e r  m i s s i l e s ,  whi le  launch  from a  sma l l  submarine 
r e v e a l s  t h e  p o s i t i o n  of o n l y  1 o r  3 o t h e r  m i s s i l e s .  Smal l  submar ines  t h u s  
enhance our  l e a s t  v u l n e r a b l e  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e  by hedging a g a i n s t  S o v i e t  advances 
i n  ASW. I n  c o n t r a s t ,  MPS enhances  o u r  most v u l n e r a b l e  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e  i n  a  way 
t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  could  d e f e a t  s imply  by adding  R V s .  Indeed ,  s u p p o r t e r s  a rgue ,  
a  f o r c e  composed of  bombers, Minuteman, T r i d e n t ,  and s m a l l  submar ines  would b e  
a  quadrad,  no t  a  dyad. 
Advocates b e l i e v e  t h e  f i r s t  u n i t s  cou ld  be deployed by 1988,  w i t h  FOC i n  
1992, d e s p i t e  d i r e  c l a ims  about  s h i p b u i l d i n g  capac i ty .  z/ Admiral Thomas 
Moorer, former Chairman of  t h e  J o i n t  C h i e f s  of  S t a f f ,  n o t e d  i n  a  CRS seminar  
on MX bas ing  t h a t  " t h e  b o t t l e n e c k  i s  i n  t h e  n u c l e a r  powered c o n s t r u c t i o n  . . . 
i t  wouldn ' t  begin  t o  t a k e  seven  y e a r s  t o  b u i l d  one of  [ t h e  submar ines] . "  z/ 
The congres s iona l  Reform Caucus i s  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  cannot  
a f f o r d  enough n u c l e a r  a t t a c k  submar ines ,  s o  must supplement  them w i t h  d i e s e l  
a t t a c k  submarines. E/ Doing s o  would spread  t h e  c o s t s  of  deve lop ing  d i e s e l  
submarines among t h o s e  s h i p s  a s  w e l l  a s  s m a l l  s t r a t e g i c  submarines.  The Uni ted  
S t a t e s  has exces s  submarine b u i l d i n g  c a p a c i t y ;  f o r  example, t h e  E l e c t r i c  Boat 
76/  I b i d . ,  p. 35. 
77/ I b i d . ,  p. 48 -
78/ D r e l l ,  Testimony on bas ing  t h e  MX a t  s e a  on s m a l l  submar ines ,  p. 17 .  -
79/ Congress iona l  Research S e r v i c e ,  Redres s ing  I C B M  V u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  Seminar 
~ r a n s c r i ~ t ,  p. 31. 
80/ Wilson, George. Caucus Urges Review of Boos ts  f o r  Defense t o  Prevent  
1 .  Washington P o s t ,  Aug. 11, 1981: A10. 
D i v i s i o n  of Gene ra l  Dynamics, which makes n u c l e a r  submarines,  i s  l a y i n g  o f f  
workers ,  and i t s  f a c i l i t y  f o r  manufac tur ing  submarine h u l l  c y l i n d e r s  i s  under-  
u t i l i z e d .  811 Fo re ign  s h i p y a r d s  could  a l s o  b u i l d  d i e s e l  submarines. For 
example, Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werf t  of West Germany, which b u i l d s  s m a l l  
d i e s e l  submarines,  has  des igned  a 2,182-metric-ton submarine and would b u i l d  
i t  f o r  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  821 
Advocates r a i s e  o t h e r  p o i n t s .  Some b e l i e v e  MPS would c o s t  a t  l e a s t  $10 
b i l l i o n  more t h a n  s m a l l  submarines w i t h  SALT 11, and even more wi thout  SALT 11. 
Because o f  t h e  nea r - coas t a l  deployment, t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  cou ld  o b t a i n  h i g h  
conf idence  i n  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  communicate w i t h  sma l l  submarines. They could  
endure  f o r  months d u r i n g  a n u c l e a r  war. I f  SALT 11 c o n s t r a i n t s  on numbers o f  
RVs t a k e  e f f e c t ,  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  could  deploy 14 R V s  on a submarine-launched 
m i s s i l e  vs .  1 0  on a land-launched one.  SALT I1 pe rmi t s  e a c h  s i d e  t o  deploy  one 
new type  of ICBM. By fo rego ing  MX and us ing  T r i d e n t  I1 on smal l  submarines,  
t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  could  avo id  u s i n g  up i t s  one  new t y p e  of ICBM.  I t  cou ld  t h e n  
develop  MX and a sma l l  ICBM and dec ide  which, i f  any, t o  deploy on t h e  b a s i s  of 
f u t u r e  arms c o n t r o l  agreements  and S o v i e t  weapon deployments. 
Opponents a rgue  t h a t  a move t o  sma l l  submarines would c r e a t e  a dyad of 
s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s ,  w i t h  a l l  t h e  d i s advan tages  t h a t  e n t a i l s .  Tha t  system h a s  
t h e  same f a i l u r e  mode a s  T r i d e n t .  I t  would have t o  be defended w i t h  ASW 
811 V e l i o t i s ,  P. Tak i s  (Execu t ive  Vice P r e s i d e n t  - Marine,  Genera l  
~ ~ n a m z s ;  Gene ra l  Manager, E l e c t r i c  Boat D i v i s i o n ) .  S ta tement  b e f o r e  t h e  
Subcommittee on  Seapower and S t r a t e g i c  and C r i t i c a l  M a t e r i a l s  of  t h e  House 
Armed S e r v i c e s  Committee, Mar. 25, 1981. p. 33; and d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h  Genera l  
Dynamics Corp. pe r sonne l ,  J u l y  1981. 
821  Tag l i abue ,  John.  Germans Try t o  S e l l  Submarines t o  U.S. New York 
~ i m e s T s e ~ t .  22, 1981: D6. 
f o r c e s ,  one Sena to r  n o t e s ,  a t  a  h idden  c o s t  of about  $12 b i l l i o n .  831 A S o v i e t  
ASW breakthrough would be " h i g h l y  d e s t a b i l i z i n g , "  OTA f i n d s .  841 I t  would 
t h r e a t e n  a  l a r g e  p o r t i o n  of our  s t r a t e g i c  f o r c e s ;  w i th  ICBMs and bombers a l r e a d y  
v u l n e r a b l e ,  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  would have  no e f f e c t i v e  d e t e r r e n t .  Secu re  land-  
based I C B M s  a r e  t hus  e s s e n t i a l  t o  hedge a g a i n s t  ASW developments .  
Small  submarines o f f e r  no advantage  r e l a t i v e  t o  T r i d e n t ,  c r i t i c s  charge .  
T r i d e n t  would p l ace  15 t o  20 submarines i n  a  15 t o  20 m i l l i o n  sq  m i  p a t r o l  
a r e a ,  vs .  28 t o  55 small submarines i n  perhaps  2  o r  3  m i l l i o n  s q  m i .  T h i s  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  would make U.S. c o a s t s  "a  f e r t i l e  h u n t i n g  ground f o r  S o v i e t  ASW 
f o r c e s , "  DOD s t a t e s .  851 A DOD s t u d y  e s t i m a t e s  t h e  l i f e  c y c l e  c o s t  of  a n  
a t - s ea  T r i d e n t  I1 m i s s i l e  on a  T r i d e n t  submarine a t  $230 m i l l i o n ,  vs. $475 
m i l l i o n  f o r  a n  MX on a  sma l l  submarine.  €31 
Even though t h e  system appea r s  t e c h n i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e ,  c r i t i c s  n o t e  many 
a r e a s  o f  r i s k .  The m i s s i l e s  would need r e l i a b l e  waterproof  c a n i s t e r s .  To 
reduce  crew s i z e ,  t h e  submarines would need much more au tomat ion  t h a n  c u r r e n t  
submarines u s e ,  t h e  Navy f i n d s .  The amount of m o d i f i c a t i o n  t o  r e q u a l i f y  MX 
f o r  underwater  deployment can be determined o n l y  a f t e r  m i s s i l e  and boa t  have 
been f i r m l y  de f ined .  The e f f e c t s  of  underwater  shock from a  n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i o n  
and m i t i g a t i o n  of shock t r a n s m i s s i o n  between capsu le  and submarine a r e  
u n c e r t a i n .  
831  Garn, Jake .  SUM: I t  Doesn ' t  Add Up. Armed Forces  J o u r n a l  I n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l ,  J an .  1980: 36-37. 
841  OTA, MX M i s s i l e  Basing:  Summary, p. 48. -
851 Department of Defense ,  ICBM Basing Op t ions ,  p. 22. -
861 System P lann ing  Corp., An Assessment of Smal l  Submarines and Encap- 
s u l a t i o n  of B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e s  -- Phase 1 ,  U n c l a s s i f i e d  Vers ion ,  Execut ive  
Summary, p. 14.  
The I O C  would be 1990-1992, w i t h  an  FOC of 1993-1995. The bases  would 
be t h e  s lowest-deployed e lement  because  of  t h e  need f o r  s i t e  s e l e c t i o n ,  
envi ronmenta l  impact s t a t emen t  p r e p a r a t i o n ,  and base  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  s o  would 
pace I O C .  - 871 The submarines would a l s o  t a k e  t i m e  t o  b u i l d .  Three s h i p y a r d s  
t h a t  do no t  now b u i l d  submarines would have t o  do so ,  OTA s t a t e s .  881 Timely 
a c q u i s i t i o n  of  needed p a r t s ,  m a t e r i a l s ,  and s k i l l e d  workers  cou ld  be  d i f f i c u l t ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  g iven  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  s h i p b u i l d i n g  program. Use of f o r e i g n  
s h i p y a r d s  might  speed c o n s t r u c t i o n .  However, a n  amendment t o  H.R. 3519 (FY82 
DOD a u t h o r i z a t i o n s )  t h a t  passed  t h e  House on J u l y  8  would, i f  i t  becomes law, 
f o r b i d  u s e  of f o r e i g n  s h i p y a r d s  f o r  b u i l d i n g  o r  ove rhau l ing  Navy s h i p s .  891 
Small  submarines would be  incompat ib le  w i th  arms c o n t r o l  because encapsu- 
l a t e d  m i s s i l e s  a t t a c h e d  t o  " t h e  l e a s t  capab le  submarine i n  t h e  world" cou ld  
be p l aced  on o t h e r  submarines and would be imposs ib le  t o  v e r i f y .  I t  i s  
argued t h a t  when t h e  "hidden c o s t s "  a r e  i nc luded ,  t h i s  sys tem cou ld  c o s t  a s  
much a s  $10 b i l l i o n  more t han  MX/MPS. 9J/ Re l i ance  on e x t e r n a l  n a v i g a t i o n  
a i d s  l i k e  Navs t a r  o r  GBS " i s  a  r i s k  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t a k e  f o r  a  c e n t r a l  s t r a -  
t e g i c  system," DOD f i n d s .  - 911 The S o v i e t s  might d e t o n a t e  n u c l e a r  weapons 
j u s t  o f f  t h e  c o n t i n e n t a l  s h e l f  t o  d e s t r o y  any s m a l l  submarines o p e r a t i n g  
t h e r e ;  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  t i d a l  waves would be d i s a s t r o u s  f o r  c o a s t a l  c i t i e s .  
871  I b i d . ,  p. 14-15. -
881 OTA, M X  M i s s i l e  Basing:  Summary, p. 33-34. 
891 See Congress iona l  Record (Da i ly  E d i t i o n ) ,  J u l y  8 ,  1981 : H4089-H4090. - 
901 Garn, SUM: I t  Doesn ' t  Add Up, p. 36-37. -
911 U.S. Department of Defense. O f f i c e  of t h e  Deputy Under S e c r e t a r y  
of  ~ e f e n s e  f o r  Research  and Eng inee r ing  ( S t r a t e g i c  and Space Systems).  An 
E v a l u a t i o n  of t h e  Shal low Underwater M i s s i l e  (SUM) concept .  A p r i l  9 ,  1980. 
p. 4. 
It would be difficult to find the needed personnel, given that the Navy is 
1,050 officers short of the 3,550 it needs for nuclear submarines, only 34% 
of officers choose further submarine duty after their first opportunity to 
leave it, and the attack submarine fleet is projected to grow from about 80 
to 100 between now and 1990. - 92/ In light of all these problems, critics 
reject small submarines as fatally flawed. 
A BROADER SOLUTION: STRATEGIC FORCE DIVERSIFICATION AND SMALL ICBMs 
Another approach sees problems with any single MX basing mode, and holds 
that strategic force diversification -- using several basing modes for ICBMs 
while retaining submarines and bombers -- offers many advantages. Many advo- 
cates of this approach envision using a small ICBM (SICBM) because they contend 
it can be based in many survivable ways. Accordingly, this section links 
diversification and SICBM even though they can be considered independently. 
The justification for diversification is the same as for the triad itself: 
Several systems provide more assurance of survivability, are harder to attack or 
defend against, etc. Similarly, its advocates hold, several basing modes can 
promote ICBM survivability. They see any single basing mode as putting all 
one's eggs in one basket. MPS, for example, could be overwhelmed if the Soviets 
break PLU or build enough RVs to destroy all the shelters. This encourages the 
Soviets to concentrate their resources on countering it. 
Years ago, it sufficed to deploy single ICBM, submarine, and bomber systems, 
for each would be effective despite Soviet counters. As a bonus, R&D costs were 
spread over many units of a system, lowering unit cost. Now, however, there 
are great uncertainties about future Soviet strategic forces, SALT policy, and 
92/ Wilson, George. Built-up Navy Founders as Submariners Opt Out. 
washington Post, Aug. 4, 1981: Al, A4. 
i n t e n t i o n s ;  I C B M s  a r e  becoming v u l n e r a b l e ;  and t h e  S o v i e t s  can i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  
t h r e a t .  Thus, any  s i n g l e  I C B M  b a s i n g  o p t i o n  i s  of  u n c e r t a i n  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
We must hedge a g a i n s t  t h e s e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  advoca t e s  hold ;  
adding  o p t i o n s ,  w h i l e  c o s t l y ,  i s  t h e  o n l y  way t o  do t h i s .  
Proponents  contend t h a t  deploying  s e v e r a l  systems i n s t e a d  of MX/MPS, each 
on a  s m a l l  s c a l e ,  o f f e r s  key advantages .  The c h o i c e  of a n  KX bas ing  mode m e r i t s  
p a i n s t a k i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  because i t  a f f e c t s  d e t e r r e n c e ,  i s  c o s t l y ,  w i l l  fo re-  
c l o s e  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and w i l l  be w i t h  u s  f o r  decades.  With s e v e r a l  ba s ing  modes, 
however, each procured i n  modest numbers and l e s s  expensive t han  MPS, t h e r e  
would be l e s s  need f o r  d e l a y  t o  make c e r t a i n  t h a t  e a c h  sys tem was t h e  a b s o l u t e  
b e s t .  We could  l e a r n  t h e  p ros  and cons of each system from o p e r a t i o n a l  expe r i -  
ence.  I f  t h e  S o v i e t s  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  t h r e a t ,  t h a t  expe r i ence  would 
l e t  u s  s e l e c t  c o n f i d e n t l y  one o p t i o n  o r  more t o  deploy r a p i d l y  on a  l a r g e r  
s c a l e  i n  response .  T h i s  p r o s p e c t  shou ld  i t s e l f  d i s s u a d e  t h e  S o v i e t s  from 
seek ing  t o  coun te r  our  systems.  
Some b e l i e v e  t h e  M X  bas ing  d e c i s i o n  i s  s o  d i f f i c u l t  because MX i s  t h e  wrong 
m i s s i l e .  They n o t e  t h a t  MX i s  a  c r e a t u r e  of SALT 11: The Uni ted  S t a t e s  r ega rds  
SALT I1 a s  p e r m i t t i n g  a  l aunch  weight  of 90,000 kg (198,414 l b )  and a  throw 
weight  of 3,600 kg (7,937 l b )  f o r  MX; M X ' s  l aunch  weight  i s  192,000 l b ,  and 
i t s  throw weight  i s  r e p o r t e d l y  7,900 l b .  931 SALT I1 l i m i t s  e a c h  s i d e  t o  820 
931 "On August 16 ,  1977, i n  a  p l e n a r y  s t a t e m e n t ,  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  inform- 
ed t h e S o v i e t  Union t h a t  ' . . . f o r  p lanning  purposes,  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  I C B M s  
i t  might  deve lop ,  t e s t  o r  deploy  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  c o n s i d e r s  t h e  
launch-weight l i m i t  on l i g h t  I C B M s  t o  be 90,000 ki lograms and t h e  throw-weight 
l i m i t  t o  b e  3,600 k i lograms. '  These f i g u r e s  a r e  based on o u r  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  t h e  
[ S o v i e t ]  SS-19 [ICBM]. The S o v i e t  Union d i d  not  respond t o  t h i s  s t a t emen t .  The 
Uni ted  S t a t e s  w i l l  r ega rd  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  a s  t h e  l i m i t s  f o r  t h e  one  new t y p e  of  
l i g h t  ICBM pe rmi t t ed  t o  t he  Uni ted  S t a t e s  under Paragraph 9  of A r t i c l e  I V . "  U.S. 
Department o f  S t a t e .  Bureau of P u b l i c  A f f a i r s .  SALT I1 Agreement, Vienna,  
June  18 ,  1979. S e l e c t e d  Documents No. 128. Washington, U.S. Govt. P r i n t .  Of f . ,  
1979. p. 13;  MX Throw weight  d a t a  from A i r  Force  Wants Space Senso r s  f o r  
Warning of A i r c r a f t  At tack  on U.S. Aerospace D a i l y ,  Feb. 5 ,  1980: 187. 
ICBMs c a r r y i n g  m u l t i p l e  independent ly  t a r g e t a b l e  r e e n t r y  v e h i c l e s  (MIRVs) and 
one new t y p e  of  I C B M  t h a t ,  i f  MIRVed, can  be t e s t e d  w i t h  a t  most 1 0  R V s .  We c a n  
t h u s  deploy t h e  maximum al lowed number of R V s  by making our  one new ICBM l a r g e  
enough t o  c a r r y  10  R V s .  MX s u p p o r t e r s  contend  we need I C B M s  on l a n d  t o  p r e s e r v e  
t h e  advantages  of t he  t r i a d .  Some f o r c e  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  advoca t e s ,  however, 
b e l i e v e  t h a t  m o b i l i t y  i s  t h e  o n l y  way t o  g a i n  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  on  l a n d ,  f o r  any  
m i s s i l e  i n  a  f i x e d  l o c a t i o n  can be des t royed .  They s e e  MX a s  t oo  l a r g e  t o  be 
t r u l y  mobi le ,  s o  suppor t  SICBM a s  w e l l  a s  MX. S a i d  one ,  "We no  l o n g e r  have  t h e  
l uxu ry  of endur ing  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  and a  prompt response  i n  o f f e n s i v e  systems t h a t  
we have  had i n  t h e  p a s t  w i t h  Minuteman. P a r t i t i o n i n g  t h e  f o r c e  w i t h  MX and 
SICBM weapons i s  needed t o  provide  both  c a p a b i l i t i e s  s imu l t aneous ly . "  - 941 
SICBM, i n  one p r e l i m i n a r y  d e s i g n ,  i s  38 f t  l o n g ,  weighs 22,013 l b ,  h a s  2  
o r  3  s t a g e s ,  and can c a r r y  a  s i n g l e  335- o r  500-k i lo ton  RV. I ts range would be 
5,500 t o  6,500 nmi. I t  would u s e  Navs t a r  s a t e l l i t e s  o r  s t e l l a r  u p d a t e s  f o r  
h igh  accuracy.  - 951 I t  might become o p e r a t i o n a l  i n  1986. - 961 It  could  be 
c a r r i e d  on l a r g e  t r u c k s ,  medium s i z e d  c a r g o  a i r c r a f t ,  b a r g e s ,  s u r f a c e  s h i p s ,  
e t c .  I t  could  be extremely d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e c t ;  i n  1979, t h e r e  were 1,339,000 
combinat ion t r a c t o r - t r a i l e r  u n i t s  i n  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  971 I t  
could  a l s o  be placed i n  s i l o s  t h a t ,  a cco rd ing  t o  one r e p o r t ,  could  be hardened 
t o  7,000 t o  8,000 p s i ,  vs .  about  2,000 p s i  f o r  Minuteman. 981 -
941 Robinson, C la rence ,  J r .  lJ.S. Weighs Small  I C B M  Development. 
~ v i a t s n  Week and Space Technology, May 4 ,  1981: 50. 
951 I b i d . ,  p. 49-52. -
9 6 1  Pincus ,  Wal te r .  Boeing O f f e r i n g  Smal l  A l t e r n a t i v e  t o  Big MX 
Missic. Washington P o s t ,  June  29, 1981 : A1 . 
971 American Trucking A s s o c i a t i o n s ,  I n c .  American Trucking  Trends ,  
1979-380.  Washington, American Trucking Assoc i a t i ons ,  I n c . ,  1981. p. 17. 
981 Robinson, U.S. Weighs Small  ICBM Development, p. 49. -
S e v e r a l  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  use  SICBM. P r o f e s s o r  Donald Snow, 
of t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  of Alabama, proposed  u s i n g  STJM, s i l o -baaed  MX defended  by 
ABMs, and road-mobile SICBMs based on m i l i t a r y  r e s e r v a t i o n s  bu t  d i s p e r s e d  
on t h e  i n t e r s t a t e  highway sys tem i n  c r i s e s .  991 Another  approach  would 
accompany MX/MPS w i t h  sma l l  I C B M s  based i n  hardened s i l o s ,  on t r u c k s ,  and on 
a i r c r a f t .  1001 One c o u l d ,  of c o u r s e ,  imagine a  SICBM-only f o r c e  w i t h  s e v e r a l  
ba s ing  modes. 
Advocates  r e c o g n i z e  t h a t  SICBM would f o r c e  t h e  U.S. t o  b r each  t h e  SALT I1 
l i m i t  of 2,250 s t r a t e g i c  n u c l e a r  d e l i v e r y  v e h i c l e s .  They c o u n t e r  t h a t  SALT 
l e t s  t h e  S o v i e t s  b u i l d  a  f o r c e  a b l e  t o  d e s t r o y  ou r  I C B M s  w h i l e  b a r r i n g  u s  from 
making our  I C B M s  s u r v i v a b l e .  The ABM T r e a t y  p r ec ludes  defending  f i x e d - s i t e  
I C B M s ,  w h i l e  SALT 11's r equ i r emen t s  f o r  v e r i f i a b i l i t y  and i t s  l i m i t s  on 
l a u n c h e r s  and d e l i v e r y  v e h i c l e s  p r ec lude  deploying  SICBM. T h i s  r e s u l t ,  they  
a r g u e ,  i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  s p i r i t  of SALT, c o n t r a r y  t o  s t a b l e  d e t e r r e n c e ,  and 
c o n t r a r y  t o  our  s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s .  We chose t he  exped i en t  cou r se  i n  l i m i t i n g  
l a u n c h e r s  r a t h e r  t h a n  R V s  o r  th row w e i g h t ,  t h e y  b e l i e v e ;  t h e  IIX d e c i s i o n ,  w i t h  
i t s  cho i ce  between s u r v i v a b l e  I C B M s  and SALT-compatible I C B M s ,  h i g h l i g h t s  t h e  
e r r o r .  To p rov ide  s u r v i v a b l e  I C B M s ,  t h e y  conc lude ,  we must r e o r i e n t  SALT. I f  
t h e  S o v i e t s  a r e  unwi l l i ng  t o  n e g o t i a t e  SALT agreements  t h a t  permi t  bo th  s i d e s  
t o  p rov ide  f o r  s t a b l e  d e t e r r e n c e ,  t h e n  we must choose s s c u r i t y  o v e r  SALT and 
proceed w i t h  SICBM, s u r v i v a b l y  deployed among d i v e r s e  ba s ing  modes. 
D i sca rd ing  SALT and b u i l d i n g  SICBMs would a c t u a l l y  promote arms l i m i t a t i o n ,  
they  a rgue .  We would move t o  a  new arms c o n t r o l  regime i n  which weapons a r e  
991  Congres s iona l  Research  S e r v i c e ,  Red re s s ing  I C B M  V u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  Seminar 
~ r a n s z i ~ t ,  p. 17 .  
100/  Robinson, 1J.S. Weighs Smal l  I C B M  Development, p.  50. -
limited not by formal agreements but by deploying weapons that give the Soviets 
no incentive to add to their ICBM force and give us no concern if they do, since 
those missiles would be of no use in attacking SICBMs they couldn't locate. 
Critics note military problems with SICBM. A counterforce attack, in which 
each RV must arrive on a precise schedule, would be difficult to coordinate for 
thousands of SICBMs based in many areas and several basing modes. They en- 
vision immense problems for the national command authority in communicating with 
thousands of SICBMs on trucks, barges, aircraft, and in silos. With MX, only 
200 or fewer missile launches need be coordinated. 
Critics point out the value of SALT. SALT I1 would cap numbers of ICBMs and 
RVs, foreclose Soviet fractionation of ICBMs, ban light RVs that could be used 
for fractionation, prevent certain types of concealment, etc. The ABM Treaty 
has prevented an arms race between one side's offensive forces and the other 
side's defense, thus permitting deterrence with fewer forces. The SALT process 
establishes a U.S.-Soviet dialog that fosters cooperation and future agreements. 
Yet SICBM would violate SALT 11. It would breach the limit of 2,250 strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles. Under most concepts, it would violate the SALT I1 
prohibition of deliberate concealment. SICBM and MX together would violate the 
SALT I1 limit of one new type of ICBM. 
Critics also dispute force diversification. Several basing modes, even 
in small numbers, would be far more costly than one. They question each basing 
mode proposed for SICBM. Hard silo basing would require thousands of missiles 
and silos to provide survivability against the current Soviet threat; if that 
threat grows, then, like MPS, many more silos would be needed. The costs of 
silo basing would be high and could skyrocket. 
Road-mobile basing would create a public outcry over nuclear weapons on 
public highways. The missiles would have to be guarded against terrorist 
h i j a c k i n g s .  Basing SICBMs on m i l i t a r y  r e s e r v a t i o n s  du r ing  peacet ime t o  avoid 
t h e s e  problems and d i s p e r s i n g  them on highways i n  c r i s e s  would c r e a t e  o t h e r  
problems. The system would r e q u i r e  warning. T r a f f i c  jams i n  c r i s e s  might 
prevent  t h e  t r u c k s  from d i s p e r s i n g .  Moving t h e  t r u c k s  o n t o  t h e  highways could  
l e a d  t h e  S o v i e t s  t o  preempt, f o r  a f t e r  s e v e r a l  hours  t h e  t r u c k s  would be 
u n t a r g e t a b l e .  S ince  SICBM t r u c k s  would be v u l n e r a b l e  t o  low o v e r p r e s s u r e s ,  
t he  S o v i e t s  might a t t empt  t o  ba r r age  l a r g e  a r e a s  w i th  n u c l e a r  weapons, t hus  
p o t e n t i a l l y  k i l l i n g  more peop le  t h a n  t h e y  would by a t t a c k i n g  MX/MPS. 
Airmobile  SICBMs would r e p l i c a t e  t h e  f laws  of a i rmob i l e  MX. They would 
r e q u i r e  warning ,  have s h o r t  endurance ,  and be  c o s t l y .  Barges  on i n l a n d  water-  
ways would i n t e r f e r e  w i th  commercial t r a f f i c  and would r e q u i r e  e x t e n s i v e  secu- 
r i t y  f o r c e s .  With more R V s ,  t h e  S o v i e t s  could  ba r r age  a l l  t h e  U.S. i n l a n d  
waterways. S a t e l l i t e s  and s h i p s  o r  submarines could d e t e c t  and a t t a c k  s u r f a c e  
s h i p s .  SICBM, w i t h  i t s  one R V ,  would n o t  be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e  f o r  u s e  on s m a l l  
submarines.  Why, c r i t i c s  a s k ,  deploy SICBM i f  t h e  m i s s i l e  and each  bas ing  
mode have s e r i o u s  problems? 
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